The problem of turnout
Riker and Ordeshook (1968) argued that because the chance of one vote changing the outcome is tiny, turnout is hard to explain without factors such as a sense of civic duty, the problem known as the paradox of voting. Blais (2000) showed that many citizens do vote out of duty. Under voluntary voting, people with more education and income vote more, so, as the civic voluntarism model suggests, differences in resources become differences in participation.
Effects of compulsory voting
Jackman (1987) found compulsory voting to be a major institutional driver of higher turnout across industrial democracies. Panagopoulos (2008) reported that turnout rises even when sanctions are weak. Using the staggered adoption across Australian states, Fowler (2013) gave causal evidence that compulsory voting raised turnout by about 24 percentage points and increased Labor vote shares and pension spending. Along with proportional representation, it is a leading institution associated with high turnout.
The debate
Lijphart (1997) argued that unequal turnout produces unequal policy and should be corrected by compulsory voting. Critics respond that the freedom not to vote is part of political expression and that random votes by uninterested voters may distort outcomes. Birch (2009) concluded that compulsory voting raises turnout but has no clear effect on political knowledge or interest.
FAQ
- What is compulsory voting in simple terms?
- A rule that makes voting a legal duty, with a small fine if you skip it without a good reason.
- Does compulsory voting change election results?
- Research on Australia found that turnout rose sharply and parties backed by groups that usually vote less gained votes.
Sources reviewed: 2026-10-26
References
- Lijphart, A. (1997). Unequal participation: Democracy's unresolved dilemma. American Political Science Review, 91(1), 1–14. The case for compulsory voting.
- Jackman, R. W. (1987). Political institutions and voter turnout in the industrial democracies. American Political Science Review, 81(2), 405–423. Institutions and turnout.
- Birch, S. (2009). Full participation: A comparative study of compulsory voting. Manchester University Press. A comparative study.
- Fowler, A. (2013). Electoral and policy consequences of voter turnout: Evidence from compulsory voting in Australia. Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 8(2), 159–182. Causal evidence from Australia.
- Panagopoulos, C. (2008). The calculus of voting in compulsory voting systems. Political Behavior, 30(4), 455–467. Sanctions and turnout.
- Riker, W. H., & Ordeshook, P. C. (1968). A theory of the calculus of voting. American Political Science Review, 62(1), 25–42. The calculus of voting.
- Blais, A. (2000). To vote or not to vote? The merits and limits of rational choice theory. University of Pittsburgh Press. Rational choice and turnout.