The vicious circle of poverty and coups
Analyzing data on 121 countries from 1950 to 1982, Londregan and Poole (1990) showed that past coups were the strongest predictor of future coups. Lower-income countries faced higher coup risk, and growth tended to slow after coups. They called this structure, in which coups breed poverty and poverty invites further coups, the coup trap. It connects to modernization theory's claim that development brings political stability.
Why coups recur
Finer (1962) argued that militaries intervene more easily where political culture is weak, and Huntington (1968) described poorly institutionalized societies as praetorian, with soldiers entering the political arena. Once a coup occurs, norms of political legitimacy erode and a practice of treating coups as solutions takes hold within the military. Belkin and Schofer (2003) summarized how structural factors such as weak civil society and low legitimacy raise coup risk.
Coup-proofing and assessments
Quinlivan (1999) analyzed how Middle Eastern rulers practiced coup-proofing by staffing the army with kin and sect members and creating parallel security forces. Such strategies strengthen personalist dictatorship but at the cost of military effectiveness. Svolik (2012) highlighted the dilemma that the more rulers rely on the army, the more political leverage it gains. Powell and Thyne's (2011) data show coups declined after the Cold War, though some regions have seen a resurgence.
FAQ
- What is the coup trap in simple terms?
- A vicious circle in which a poor country that has a coup grows poorer, making another coup more likely.
- What is coup-proofing?
- Rulers filling the army with trusted kin or group members, or creating separate guard and security units to check the army.
Sources reviewed: 2026-10-26
References
- Londregan, J. B., & Poole, K. T. (1990). Poverty, the coup trap, and the seizure of executive power. World Politics, 42(2), 151–183. The founding study of the coup trap.
- Powell, J. M., & Thyne, C. L. (2011). Global instances of coups from 1950 to 2010: A new dataset. Journal of Peace Research, 48(2), 249–259. A global coup dataset.
- Belkin, A., & Schofer, E. (2003). Toward a structural understanding of coup risk. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 47(5), 594–620. Structural coup risk.
- Quinlivan, J. T. (1999). Coup-proofing: Its practice and consequences in the Middle East. International Security, 24(2), 131–165. Coup-proofing strategies.
- Finer, S. E. (1962). The man on horseback: The role of the military in politics. Pall Mall Press. Classic on military intervention.
- Huntington, S. P. (1968). Political order in changing societies. Yale University Press. Praetorianism and political order.
- Svolik, M. W. (2012). The politics of authoritarian rule. Cambridge University Press. Military moral hazard.