Unpleasant arithmetic
Sargent and Wallace (1981) showed that persistent deficits eventually force monetisation, so tight money today may mean higher inflation later.
Active and passive
Leeper (1991) classified active and passive policies. With an active Taylor-rule central bank and passive fiscal policy, monetary dominance holds; otherwise prices adjust to debt, as in Sims (1994) and Woodford (1995, 2001).
Debates
Cochrane (2001) added long-term debt; Bassetto (2002) offered a game-theoretic critique. The idea relates to failures of Ricardian equivalence and to central-bank independence.
FAQ
- What is fiscal dominance in simple terms?
- Government debt is so large that the central bank must put it ahead of inflation.
- Why does it cause inflation?
- Monetising debt or holding rates low can push prices up.
Sources reviewed: 2026-10-26
References
- Sargent, T. J., & Wallace, N. (1981). Some unpleasant monetarist arithmetic. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, 5(3), 1–17. The classic origin.
- Leeper, E. M. (1991). Equilibria under 'active' and 'passive' monetary and fiscal policies. Journal of Monetary Economics, 27(1), 129–147. Active and passive policies.
- Sims, C. A. (1994). A simple model for study of the determination of the price level and the interaction of monetary and fiscal policy. Economic Theory, 4(3), 381–399. Fiscal theory of the price level.
- Woodford, M. (1995). Price-level determinacy without control of a monetary aggregate. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 43, 1–46. Price-level determinacy.
- Woodford, M. (2001). Fiscal requirements for price stability. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 33(3), 669–728. Fiscal requirements for stability.
- Cochrane, J. H. (2001). Long-term debt and optimal policy in the fiscal theory of the price level. Econometrica, 69(1), 69–116. Long-term debt in the fiscal theory.
- Bassetto, M. (2002). A game-theoretic view of the fiscal theory of the price level. Econometrica, 70(6), 2167–2195. A key critique.
