First-generation theory: assigning functions
Musgrave (1959) divided fiscal functions into allocation, distribution and stabilization, arguing that the central government should handle distribution and stabilization while local governments allocate local public goods. Tiebout (1956) argued that residents' 'voting with their feet', moving to places whose mix of taxes and services fits their preferences, leads to efficient provision of local public goods.
Oates's decentralization theorem
Oates (1972) proposed the decentralization theorem: absent interregional spillovers and major economies of scale, local governments supplying public goods tailored to local preferences is more efficient than uniform central provision. Oates (1999) synthesized the theory, covering intergovernmental grants to correct spillovers, the assignment of taxing powers and the pros and cons of interjurisdictional competition.
Second-generation theory: political incentives
Weingast (1995) proposed market-preserving federalism, under which federalism restrains state predation and preserves markets when subnational governments hold primary economic authority, a common market is ensured and budget constraints are hard. Qian and Weingast (1997) argued that China's decentralization reforms had this effect. Rodden (2006) highlighted the soft budget constraint problem, in which local governments that expect central bailouts overborrow, concluding that the effects of decentralization depend on institutional design.
FAQ
- What is fiscal federalism in simple terms?
- It is the theory of which public tasks and taxes are best handled by the central government and which by local governments.
- Is decentralization always good?
- No. When spillovers between regions are large or local governments overborrow expecting central bailouts, decentralization can cause problems.
Sources reviewed: 2026-10-26
References
- Tiebout, C. M. (1956). A pure theory of local expenditures. Journal of Political Economy, 64(5), 416–424. Voting with one's feet.
- Musgrave, R. A. (1959). The theory of public finance: A study in public economy. McGraw-Hill. Three functions of public finance.
- Oates, W. E. (1972). Fiscal federalism. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. The decentralization theorem.
- Oates, W. E. (1999). An essay on fiscal federalism. Journal of Economic Literature, 37(3), 1120–1149. A review essay.
- Weingast, B. R. (1995). The economic role of political institutions: Market-preserving federalism and economic development. The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 11(1), 1–31. Market-preserving federalism.
- Qian, Y., & Weingast, B. R. (1997). Federalism as a commitment to preserving market incentives. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11(4), 83–92. China's decentralization.
- Rodden, J. A. (2006). Hamilton's paradox: The promise and peril of fiscal federalism. Cambridge University Press. Soft budget constraints.
