Core argument
Hall and Deardorff (2006) argued that legislators pursue many policy goals at once while chronically short of time, staff and expertise. Lobbyists supply research, bill language and coalition-building help, lowering the cost of effort on particular policies. This does not change legislators' preferences but subsidizes acting on preferences they already hold. As a result, legislators devote more time and effort to the issues lobbyists care about.
Lobbying friends
Persuasion models predicted that lobbying would target neutral or opposed legislators, but evidence showed the reverse. Hojnacki and Kimball (1998) found that interest groups mainly lobby allies. Hall and Wayman (1990) laid the groundwork by showing that campaign money mobilizes legislators' participation and effort in committees rather than buying votes. Austen-Smith and Wright (1994) explained lobbying allies as an effort to counteract the other side's lobbying.
Implications and limits
On this view, inequality in lobbying appears in subtler forms than vote-buying corruption: groups with more resources subsidize more of their allies' effort, so their issues receive more attention. This links to the structural advantage of business noted by neo-pluralism and to debates on regulatory capture. However, Baumgartner and colleagues (2009) found that more lobbying resources do not guarantee policy wins and that the status quo is powerful, and de Figueiredo and Richter (2014) noted the methodological difficulty of measuring lobbying effects.
FAQ
- What is lobbying as legislative subsidy in simple terms?
- Instead of persuading opponents, lobbyists give allied legislators free research and draft bills to help them work harder on shared goals.
- Why does the theory matter?
- It explains why interest groups lobby legislators who already agree with them and shows that lobbying influence works through legislators' time and attention rather than vote-buying.
Sources reviewed: 2026-10-26
References
- Hall, R. L., & Deardorff, A. V. (2006). Lobbying as legislative subsidy. American Political Science Review, 100(1), 69–84. The founding article.
- Hall, R. L., & Wayman, F. W. (1990). Buying time: Moneyed interests and the mobilization of bias in congressional committees. American Political Science Review, 84(3), 797–820. Buying effort, not votes.
- Austen-Smith, D., & Wright, J. R. (1994). Counteractive lobbying. American Journal of Political Science, 38(1), 25–44. Counteractive lobbying.
- Hojnacki, M., & Kimball, D. C. (1998). Organized interests and the decision of whom to lobby in Congress. American Political Science Review, 92(4), 775–790. Lobbying allies.
- de Figueiredo, J. M., & Richter, B. K. (2014). Advancing the empirical research on lobbying. Annual Review of Political Science, 17, 163–185. Review of lobbying research.
- Baumgartner, F. R., Berry, J. M., Hojnacki, M., Kimball, D. C., & Leech, B. L. (2009). Lobbying and policy change: Who wins, who loses, and why. University of Chicago Press. Who wins and loses.
- Kollman, K. (1998). Outside lobbying: Public opinion and interest group strategies. Princeton University Press. Outside lobbying.