核心主张
不改变偏好而助其实现。
游说盟友
利益集团主要游说友好议员。
含义与局限
常见问题
- 简单来说是什么？
- 以资料支援盟友议员。
- 为何重要？
- 解释为何游说盟友。
来源核查日期：2026-10-26
参考文献
- Hall, R. L., & Deardorff, A. V. (2006). Lobbying as legislative subsidy. American Political Science Review, 100(1), 69–84. 提出立法补贴理论的原典，适合了解核心主张。
- Hall, R. L., & Wayman, F. W. (1990). Buying time: Moneyed interests and the mobilization of bias in congressional committees. American Political Science Review, 84(3), 797–820. 认为政治献金购买的是议员努力而非选票的研究，适合了解理论前身。
- Austen-Smith, D., & Wright, J. R. (1994). Counteractive lobbying. American Journal of Political Science, 38(1), 25–44. 认为游说者为抵消对方游说而行动的模型，适合了解竞争理论。
- Hojnacki, M., & Kimball, D. C. (1998). Organized interests and the decision of whom to lobby in Congress. American Political Science Review, 92(4), 775–790. 显示利益集团主要游说友好议员的实证研究，适合了解核心依据。
- de Figueiredo, J. M., & Richter, B. K. (2014). Advancing the empirical research on lobbying. Annual Review of Political Science, 17, 163–185. 整理游说实证研究的综述，适合了解研究动向。
- Baumgartner, F. R., Berry, J. M., Hojnacki, M., Kimball, D. C., & Leech, B. L. (2009). Lobbying and policy change: Who wins, who loses, and why. University of Chicago Press. 大规模分析游说效果局限的著作，适合了解维持现状偏向。
- Kollman, K. (1998). Outside lobbying: Public opinion and interest group strategies. Princeton University Press. 分析动员舆论的外部游说的著作，适合了解其他游说策略。