Concept and origins
Duverger (1954) pointed to a psychological effect in plurality elections: voters who see a vote for a third party as wasted shift to the less disliked of the two major parties. This is a main mechanism behind Duverger's law. Strategic voting differs from sincere voting because voters weigh not only their preferences but also expectations about how others will vote.
Theory: strategic coordination
Cox (1997) proposed that with district magnitude M, strategic voting pushes the effective number of candidates toward M+1, a result that holds when voters share the same polling information. Myatt (2007) built a game-theoretic model with uncertainty about candidate support and showed that strategic voting may produce only partial coordination rather than full two-party convergence.
Measurement and evidence
Abramson and colleagues (1992) measured preferences and perceived viability in the 1988 US presidential primaries and showed that sophisticated voting occurred. Alvarez and Nagler (2000) proposed a model for multiparty elections combining preferences and competitiveness, and Blais and colleagues (2001) estimated that strategic voting in Canada was a few percent of all votes but could change outcomes in close districts. Conversely, sincere voting tends to rise in low-stakes contests such as second-order elections.
FAQ
- What is strategic voting in simple terms?
- When your favorite candidate seems unlikely to win, you vote for the best of the viable candidates so your vote is not wasted.
- How common is strategic voting?
- Measurement studies find it is limited to a minority of voters, but in close districts it can be enough to change who wins.
Sources reviewed: 2026-10-26
References
- Duverger, M. (1954). Political parties: Their organization and activity in the modern state. Methuen. The psychological effect.
- Abramson, P. R., Aldrich, J. H., Paolino, P., & Rohde, D. W. (1992). "Sophisticated" voting in the 1988 presidential primaries. American Political Science Review, 86(1), 55–69. Sophisticated voting in primaries.
- Cox, G. W. (1997). Making votes count: Strategic coordination in the world's electoral systems. Cambridge University Press. Strategic coordination.
- Alvarez, R. M., & Nagler, J. (2000). A new approach for modelling strategic voting in multiparty elections. British Journal of Political Science, 30(1), 57–75. Modelling strategic voting.
- Blais, A., Nadeau, R., Gidengil, E., & Nevitte, N. (2001). Measuring strategic voting in multiparty plurality elections. Electoral Studies, 20(3), 343–352. Measuring its extent.
- Myatt, D. P. (2007). On the theory of strategic voting. The Review of Economic Studies, 74(1), 255–281. Game-theoretic analysis.
- Calvert, R. L., & Ferejohn, J. A. (1983). Coattail voting in recent presidential elections. American Political Science Review, 77(2), 407–419. Linked vote choices.
