How it works
Keck and Sikkink (1998) began with the 'blockage' domestic groups face under repressive or unresponsive governments. Domestic groups send information to foreign NGOs, and these networks lead their own governments or international organizations to apply diplomatic or economic pressure on the original government. Pressure thus returns like a boomerang and changes the government's policies or behavior. Human rights movements under Latin American military regimes in the 1970s and 1980s are a key case. The model can be seen as contentious politics extended across borders.
Four strategies
Keck and Sikkink (1999) identified four network strategies: information politics, quickly gathering and spreading information; symbolic politics, dramatizing issues through symbolic events and stories; leverage politics, enlisting powerful actors; and accountability politics, holding governments to principles they have endorsed. Networks are most effective on issues with clear responsibility, such as bodily harm or denial of legal equality. The model connects to the norm life cycle of international norm diffusion.
The spiral model and critiques
Risse, Ropp and Sikkink (1999) extended the boomerang into a 'spiral model' of repeated boomerangs, in which repressive states move from denying human rights norms through tactical concessions and prescriptive status to rule-consistent behavior. Their 2013 follow-up revisited the gap between commitment and compliance. Carpenter (2007) analyzed why some harms become international issues while others are ignored, and Bob (2005) argued that local movements compete for international support and tailor themselves to Northern NGOs' preferences.
FAQ
- What is the boomerang model in simple terms?
- Civil society groups blocked by their own government team up with foreign groups so that foreign governments or international bodies apply pressure, which comes back to change their government.
- How does it differ from the spiral model?
- The spiral model describes repeated boomerangs through which repressive states move from denial to concession, acceptance and compliance with human rights norms.
Sources reviewed: 2026-10-26
References
- Keck, M. E., & Sikkink, K. (1998). Activists beyond borders: Advocacy networks in international politics. Cornell University Press. The founding book.
- Keck, M. E., & Sikkink, K. (1999). Transnational advocacy networks in international and regional politics. International Social Science Journal, 51(159), 89–101. Concise summary.
- Risse, T., Ropp, S. C., & Sikkink, K. (Eds.). (1999). The power of human rights: International norms and domestic change. Cambridge University Press. The spiral model.
- Risse, T., Ropp, S. C., & Sikkink, K. (Eds.). (2013). The persistent power of human rights: From commitment to compliance. Cambridge University Press. From commitment to compliance.
- Carpenter, R. C. (2007). Setting the advocacy agenda: Theorizing issue emergence and nonemergence in transnational advocacy networks. International Studies Quarterly, 51(1), 99–120. Issue emergence.
- Bob, C. (2005). The marketing of rebellion: Insurgents, media, and international activism. Cambridge University Press. Competition for support.
- Tarrow, S. (2005). The new transnational activism. Cambridge University Press. Transnational activism.