From consociationalism to consensus
Studying how deeply divided societies such as the Netherlands, split along religious and ideological lines, sustained stable democracy, Lijphart (1969) proposed consociational democracy. Divided societies can be stable, he argued, when elites of each group form a grand coalition, distribute posts and budgets proportionally, hold mutual vetoes on vital issues and enjoy segmental autonomy over their own affairs. Lijphart (1977) extended this to many plural societies. He later generalized the idea, arguing that every democracy can be placed somewhere between a majoritarian model that concentrates power and a consensus model that disperses and shares it.
Ten variables
Lijphart (1999) compared 36 democracies on ten variables. The executives–parties dimension covers single-party versus coalition cabinets, executive dominance versus executive–legislative balance, two-party versus multiparty systems, majoritarian versus proportional elections, and interest group pluralism versus corporatism. The federal–unitary dimension covers unitary versus federal government, unicameralism versus bicameralism, flexible versus rigid constitutions, weak versus strong judicial review, and dependent versus independent central banks. The United Kingdom and New Zealand (before electoral reform) were classed as prototypes of majoritarian democracy, and Switzerland and Belgium as prototypes of consensus democracy. He argued that consensus democracies perform no worse economically and are kinder, gentler democracies on welfare, the environment and women's representation. As Duverger's law suggests, electoral systems are linked to party systems, so these variables tend to cluster.
Performance debates and critiques
Anderson and Guillory (1997) reported that in consensus systems even voters on the losing side are relatively satisfied with democracy. Armingeon (2002), however, found the policy performance of consensus democracy less clear than Lijphart claimed, and Bernauer and Vatter (2012) found that different consensual institutions affect satisfaction differently. Powell (2000) concluded that the two models pursue different democratic values: majoritarian systems make responsibility clear so voters can more easily hold governments accountable, while proportional systems better represent diverse views. Critics note that multiplying veto players in consensus systems can make reform difficult and blur accountability. The consensus model is also frequently invoked in debates over electoral reform in South Korea.
FAQ
- What is consensus democracy in simple terms?
- Instead of the election winner taking all power, many parties and groups share power and decide through negotiation and agreement. Proportional representation, multiparty systems and coalition governments are its typical features.
- How does it differ from majoritarian democracy?
- In majoritarian systems like Britain's, a single party governs, decides quickly and bears clear responsibility; in consensus systems like Switzerland's, many forces decide together, representing diverse views but deciding more slowly and spreading responsibility.
Sources reviewed: 2026-10-26
References
- Lijphart, A. (1969). Consociational democracy. World Politics, 21(2), 207–225. Consociationalism — the root of Lijphart's consensus model.
- Lijphart, A. (1977). Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Comparative cases of consociational devices in plural societies.
- Lijphart, A. (1999). Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. The ten-variable comparison of majoritarian and consensus democracy.
- Powell, G. B., Jr. (2000). Elections as Instruments of Democracy: Majoritarian and Proportional Visions. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Majoritarian accountability versus proportional representation.
- Anderson, C. J., & Guillory, C. A. (1997). Political institutions and satisfaction with democracy: A cross-national analysis of consensus and majoritarian systems. American Political Science Review, 91(1), 66–81. Losers are more satisfied with democracy in consensus systems.
- Armingeon, K. (2002). The effects of negotiation democracy: A comparative analysis. European Journal of Political Research, 41(1), 81–105. Re-examines the policy effects of consensus democracy.
- Bernauer, J., & Vatter, A. (2012). Can't get no satisfaction with the Westminster model? Winners, losers and the effects of consensual and direct democratic institutions on satisfaction with democracy. European Journal of Political Research, 51(4), 435–468. Separates effects of consensual and direct-democratic institutions.