The reelection assumption
Mayhew (1974) acknowledged that members have other goals but argued that assuming they want only reelection explains much of congressional behavior. He identified advertising to build name recognition, credit claiming for benefits delivered to the district and position taking on issues voters care about. In an article the same year he pointed to the 'vanishing marginals', the decline of competitive districts, laying a foundation for research on the incumbency advantage.
Members and their districts
Fenno (1977, 1978) followed members around their districts and found that they perceive their constituencies as nested concentric circles and develop a 'home style' to build trust. This connects to the personal vote, which stresses personal trust and service over policy. Mayhew also saw the committee system and the distribution of particularistic projects as designed to serve the reelection motive.
Evidence and assessments
Canes-Wrone, Brady and Cogan (2002) showed that House members who voted out of step with their districts lost vote share, confirming electoral accountability. Ansolabehere, Snyder and Stewart (2001) found candidate positions respond to district preferences but are also strongly shaped by party. Grimmer (2013) showed that members in competitive districts emphasize appropriations rather than controversial positions, revealing how reelection incentives can alter representation. The theory is usefully read alongside retrospective voting.
FAQ
- What is the electoral connection in simple terms?
- The idea that if you assume legislators care most about winning the next election, most of what they do makes sense.
- What are the three reelection activities?
- Advertising to build name recognition, credit claiming for district benefits and position taking on issues voters like.
Sources reviewed: 2026-10-26
References
- Mayhew, D. R. (1974). Congress: The electoral connection. Yale University Press. The founding statement of the theory.
- Mayhew, D. R. (1974). Congressional elections: The case of the vanishing marginals. Polity, 6(3), 295–317. The vanishing marginals.
- Fenno, R. F. (1977). U.S. House members in their constituencies: An exploration. American Political Science Review, 71(3), 883–917. Members at home in their districts.
- Fenno, R. F. (1978). Home style: House members in their districts. Little, Brown. Home style in depth.
- Canes-Wrone, B., Brady, D. W., & Cogan, J. F. (2002). Out of step, out of office: Electoral accountability and House members' voting. American Political Science Review, 96(1), 127–140. Evidence of electoral accountability.
- Ansolabehere, S., Snyder, J. M., Jr., & Stewart, C., III. (2001). Candidate positioning in U.S. House elections. American Journal of Political Science, 45(1), 136–159. Candidate positioning and district preferences.
- Grimmer, J. (2013). Appropriators not position takers: The distorting effects of electoral incentives on congressional representation. American Journal of Political Science, 57(3), 624–642. Credit claiming versus position taking.
