Types of quotas
Krook (2009) distinguished three main types: reserved seats that set aside seats for women, legislated candidate quotas that legally require parties to fill a share of their lists with women, and voluntary party quotas that parties adopt themselves. Legislated quotas work best when they include placement rules and sanctions for noncompliance, and they are known to function particularly well with party lists under proportional representation.
The logic of adoption
Dahlerup and Freidenvall (2005) contrasted an 'incremental track', in which women's numbers rise gradually with social change as in the Nordic countries, with a 'fast track' that raises their share quickly through institutional rules. Supporters argue that women's presence itself realizes descriptive representation and that passing a critical mass changes policy agendas. Critics counter that quotas conflict with merit or may amount to tokenism.
Empirical effects
Using randomized reservation of village council seats in India, Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) showed that women leaders invest more in public goods women prioritize, such as drinking water. Beaman and colleagues (2009) reported that voter bias declines in villages that have experienced women leaders. Besley and colleagues (2017) found that the Swedish Social Democrats' quota pushed out mediocre men and raised overall competence, and O'Brien and Rickne (2016) found quotas also advance women into leadership. Franceschet and Piscopo (2008) noted both achievements and limits for substantive representation in Argentina.
FAQ
- What are gender quotas in simple terms?
- Rules that set aside a share of parliamentary seats or party candidacies for women to increase their numbers quickly.
- Do quotas lower politicians' competence?
- That concern exists, but studies such as those from Sweden found the opposite: less competent men were pushed out and overall competence rose.
Sources reviewed: 2026-10-26
References
- Krook, M. L. (2009). Quotas for women in politics: Gender and candidate selection reform worldwide. Oxford University Press. A global comparative study.
- Dahlerup, D., & Freidenvall, L. (2005). Quotas as a 'fast track' to equal representation for women. International Feminist Journal of Politics, 7(1), 26–48. Fast track versus incremental track.
- Chattopadhyay, R., & Duflo, E. (2004). Women as policy makers: Evidence from a randomized policy experiment in India. Econometrica, 72(5), 1409–1443. Causal evidence from India.
- Beaman, L., Chattopadhyay, R., Duflo, E., Pande, R., & Topalova, P. (2009). Powerful women: Does exposure reduce bias? Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124(4), 1497–1540. Exposure and bias.
- Franceschet, S., & Piscopo, J. M. (2008). Gender quotas and women's substantive representation: Lessons from Argentina. Politics & Gender, 4(3), 393–425. Substantive representation in Argentina.
- Besley, T., Folke, O., Persson, T., & Rickne, J. (2017). Gender quotas and the crisis of the mediocre man: Theory and evidence from Sweden. American Economic Review, 107(8), 2204–2242. Quotas and competence.
- O'Brien, D. Z., & Rickne, J. (2016). Gender quotas and women's political leadership. American Political Science Review, 110(1), 112–126. Quotas and leadership.