Concept
Fischel (2001) called homeowners 'homevoters'. Because a house is a large, undiversified asset, owners respond closely to local policies affecting its value, such as school quality, taxes and development, monitoring local government much as shareholders monitor a firm. This complements the Tiebout model.
Evidence
Hilber and Mayer (2004) showed childless owners support school spending because good schools raise house prices. Dehring, Depken and Ward (2008) offered a direct test linking stadium announcements, home values and votes. Fischel (2001) also tied homevoters to the benefit view of the property tax.
Housing supply and critiques
Ortalo-Magné and Prat (2014) modelled owner majorities voting to restrict housing supply. Einstein and colleagues (2019) showed owners blocking new housing in public meetings, a form of NIMBYism, and Hankinson (2018) found renters in high-rent areas behave similarly. Critics say such restrictions worsen affordability and gentrification.
FAQ
- What is the homevoter hypothesis in simple terms?
- Homeowners actively shape local politics to protect the value of their homes.
- How does it relate to NIMBYism?
- It explains why owners oppose new housing or facilities they fear will lower home values.
Sources reviewed: 2026-10-26
References
- Fischel, W. A. (2001). The homevoter hypothesis: How home values influence local government taxation, school finance, and land-use policies. Harvard University Press. The founding book of the hypothesis.
- Fischel, W. A. (2001). Homevoters, municipal corporate governance, and the benefit view of the property tax. National Tax Journal, 54(1), 157–173. Links homevoters to the property tax.
- Hilber, C. A. L., & Mayer, C. (2004). Why do households without children support local public schools? (NBER Working Paper No. 10804). National Bureau of Economic Research. Childless owners back schools because of house values.
- Dehring, C. A., Depken, C. A., & Ward, M. R. (2008). A direct test of the homevoter hypothesis. Journal of Urban Economics, 64(1), 155–170. A direct test using a stadium referendum.
- Ortalo-Magné, F., & Prat, A. (2014). On the political economy of urban growth: Homeownership versus affordability. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 6(1), 154–181. Models owners voting to restrict growth.
- Hankinson, M. (2018). When do renters behave like homeowners? High rent, price anxiety, and NIMBYism. American Political Science Review, 112(3), 473–493. Renters can also show NIMBYism.
- Einstein, K. L., Glick, D. M., & Palmer, M. (2019). Neighborhood defenders: Participatory politics and America's housing crisis. Cambridge University Press. How participatory meetings block housing.