Definition and formation
Krasner (1982) defined international regimes as implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Principles are beliefs of fact and causation; norms are standards of rights and obligations; rules are specific prescriptions for action; and decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making collective choices. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and its successor, the World Trade Organization, are leading examples of a free trade regime. Young (1982) argued that regimes may arise spontaneously, be negotiated or be imposed by powerful states. Using game theory, Stein (1982) explained that regimes become necessary in coordination situations, where states gain by aligning with each other, and in collaboration situations, where they must jointly resist the temptation to defect.
Cooperation after hegemony
Hegemonic stability theory held that international cooperation depends on a single dominant power upholding order, so the persistence of extensive cooperation after the relative decline of the United States in the 1970s was a puzzle. In After Hegemony, Keohane (1984) argued that cooperation can continue as hegemony wanes because regimes provide information, reduce transaction costs of negotiation and raise reputational costs for states that break commitments. This neoliberal institutionalism accepted the realist assumption that states pursue self-interest while holding that institutions make cooperation possible. Together with work on complex interdependence, it became central to international political economy.
Three schools and critiques
Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger (1997) grouped regime theories into three schools: realist power-based theories, which see regimes as reflecting the distribution of power; neoliberal interest-based theories, which stress common interests and reduced transaction costs; and cognitivist or constructivist knowledge-based theories, which see knowledge, ideas and identities as shaping regimes. Haggard and Simmons (1987) similarly compared structural, game-theoretic, functional and cognitive approaches. Strange (1982), by contrast, criticized the regime concept as vague and possibly a passing fad, arguing that its state-centric view obscures the interests of powerful states such as the United States and the power of markets. Regime theory now continues in research on global governance in areas such as climate change, the internet and health.
FAQ
- What is international regime theory in simple terms?
- It explains that even without a world government, cooperation is possible because in each area, such as trade, the environment or nuclear weapons, states share a bundle of principles and rules — a regime — that they jointly observe.
- Are regimes the same as international organizations?
- No. A regime is a system of principles, norms, rules and procedures and can exist without a formal organization. International organizations often serve as bodies that administer and monitor regimes.
Sources reviewed: 2026-10-26
References
- Krasner, S. D. (1982). Structural causes and regime consequences: Regimes as intervening variables. International Organization, 36(2), 185–205. The standard definition of regimes: principles, norms, rules, procedures.
- Stein, A. A. (1982). Coordination and collaboration: Regimes in an anarchic world. International Organization, 36(2), 299–324. Regimes as solutions to coordination and collaboration games.
- Young, O. R. (1982). Regime dynamics: The rise and fall of international regimes. International Organization, 36(2), 277–297. Spontaneous, negotiated and imposed regimes and how they change.
- Strange, S. (1982). Cave! hic dragones: A critique of regime analysis. International Organization, 36(2), 479–496. The classic critique of regime analysis as vague and state-centric.
- Keohane, R. O. (1984). After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Neoliberal institutionalism: regimes sustain cooperation after hegemony.
- Haggard, S., & Simmons, B. A. (1987). Theories of international regimes. International Organization, 41(3), 491–517. A review comparing structural, game-theoretic, functional and cognitive approaches.
- Hasenclever, A., Mayer, P., & Rittberger, V. (1997). Theories of International Regimes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Power-, interest- and knowledge-based schools of regime theory.