Hardin's argument
In a 1968 essay in Science, biologist Garrett Hardin described a common pasture. Each herder gains fully from adding an animal but shares the cost of overgrazing, so all keep adding animals until the pasture is ruined.
Common-pool resources
They are rival, since one person's use reduces what is left, yet hard to exclude others from, which invites free riding and negative externalities.
Examples
- Overfishing
- Groundwater depletion
- Air pollution and greenhouse gas emissions
Remedies
- Regulation: quotas, taxes, permits
- Property rights: privatization or tradable quotas
- Community governance: Elinor Ostrom documented communities that sustained resources using design principles such as clear boundaries, user-made rules, monitoring and graduated sanctions.
References
- Hardin, G. (1968). The tragedy of the commons. Science, 162(3859), 1243-1248.
- Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge University Press.
- Dietz, T., Ostrom, E., & Stern, P. C. (2003). The struggle to govern the commons. Science, 302(5652), 1907-1912.