Tragedy of the Anticommons

Origins and symmetry with the commons

Hardin's (1968) tragedy of the commons is the problem of overuse when no one can exclude anyone else. Michelman (1982) used the term anticommons for the opposite state, in which everyone can exclude everyone else and so no one can use the resource. Heller (1998) observed that in post-Soviet Moscow, street kiosks thrived while well-built storefronts sat empty. Rights to lease, occupy, receive revenue from and approve use of a single building were split among different bodies, so no one could use it alone. Just as Ostrom (1990) studied institutional solutions to managing common-pool resources, the anticommons can be seen as a problem of designing rights.

The economic structure: complementary rights

Buchanan and Yoon (2000) showed with a formal model that the commons and anticommons are symmetric tragedies. When multiple rights holders each set fees independently, the total cost becomes too high and use falls. This is the same logic as Cournot's (1838) analysis of complementary monopoly, in which separate monopolists of copper and zinc push the price of brass above what a single monopolist would charge. Parisi, Schulz and Depoorter (2005) unified commons and anticommons as a duality in property. Under the Coase theorem bargaining could solve the problem, but the more rights holders there are, the greater the transaction costs and holdout problems, so in practice it is hard to resolve.

Patent thickets and the empirical debate

Heller and Eisenberg (1998) warned that when patents on upstream research tools such as gene fragments are fragmented, it becomes hard to assemble all the rights needed to develop new drugs, which could stifle innovation. Shapiro (2001) analyzed the patent thicket formed by overlapping patents and remedies such as cross-licensing, patent pools and standard setting, and Lerner and Tirole (2004) set out conditions for efficient patent pools. The evidence is mixed. Walsh, Arora and Cohen (2003) reported that researchers largely work around the problem informally, but Murray and Stern (2007) found that citations to papers fell after related patents were granted, and Williams (2013) reported that Celera's intellectual property restrictions on the human genome reduced subsequent research and product development. Heller (2008) extended the idea into what he called the gridlock economy.

FAQ

What is the tragedy of the anticommons in simple terms?

To use a resource you need permission from many people, and if even one says no, you can't use it, so the resource ends up sitting idle.

How is it different from the tragedy of the commons?

In the tragedy of the commons, anyone can use a resource, so it gets overused and ruined. In the anticommons, too many people can block use, so the resource is underused. They are mirror images.

Sources reviewed: 2026-10-26

References

1. Michelman, F. I. (1982). Ethics, economics, and the law of property. In J. R. Pennock & J. W. Chapman (Eds.), NOMOS XXIV: Ethics, Economics, and the Law (pp. 3–40). New York: New York University Press.
2. Heller, M. A. (1998). The tragedy of the anticommons: Property in the transition from Marx to markets. Harvard Law Review, 111(3), 621–688.
3. Heller, M. A., & Eisenberg, R. S. (1998). Can patents deter innovation? The anticommons in biomedical research. Science, 280(5364), 698–701.
4. Hardin, G. (1968). The tragedy of the commons. Science, 162(3859), 1243–1248.
5. Buchanan, J. M., & Yoon, Y. J. (2000). Symmetric tragedies: Commons and anticommons. Journal of Law and Economics, 43(1), 1–13.
6. Cournot, A. A. (1838). Recherches sur les principes mathématiques de la théorie des richesses. Paris: Hachette.
7. Shapiro, C. (2001). Navigating the patent thicket: Cross licenses, patent pools, and standard setting. Innovation Policy and the Economy, 1, 119–150.
8. Parisi, F., Schulz, N., & Depoorter, B. (2005). Duality in property: Commons and anticommons. International Review of Law and Economics, 25(4), 578–591.
9. Heller, M. (2008). The Gridlock Economy: How Too Much Ownership Wrecks Markets, Stops Innovation, and Costs Lives. New York: Basic Books.
10. Walsh, J. P., Arora, A., & Cohen, W. M. (2003). Working through the patent problem. Science, 299(5609), 1021.
11. Murray, F., & Stern, S. (2007). Do formal intellectual property rights hinder the free flow of scientific knowledge? Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 63(4), 648–687.
12. Williams, H. L. (2013). Intellectual property rights and innovation: Evidence from the human genome. Journal of Political Economy, 121(1), 1–27.
13. Lerner, J., & Tirole, J. (2004). Efficient patent pools. American Economic Review, 94(3), 691–711.
14. Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the Commons. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.