Mertonian Norms

The four norms and their background

Merton (1938) held that science can flourish only within a particular social order. Writing against the backdrop of Nazi Germany's imposition of "Aryan science," Merton (1942) summarized the institutional ethos of science in four norms. Communalism is the principle that scientific findings are the common heritage of the community, and that what scientists gain is not ownership but recognition and esteem. Universalism holds that truth claims must be judged by preestablished impersonal criteria, regardless of the personal or social attributes of those making them. Disinterestedness does not mean that individual scientists are altruistic. Rather, institutional mechanisms such as peer scrutiny and publication curb misconduct for personal gain. Organized skepticism is the principle that no claim is accepted without empirical and logical scrutiny, linking it to the tradition in the philosophy of science that emphasizes falsifiability.

The reward system and priority disputes

Analyzing the priority disputes over discoveries that recur throughout the history of science, Merton (1957) showed that the reward system of science revolves around recognition for originality. Because the communalism norm means knowledge itself cannot be owned, recognition for being first becomes a scientist's most important reward. Merton (1968) described the Matthew effect, in which already eminent scientists receive more credit for the same contribution, noting that the reward system can strain against the universalism norm. Dasgupta and David (1994) interpreted this structure economically, analyzing the priority rule as an efficient institution that encourages rapid disclosure of knowledge. Merton (1973) collected and systematized these studies in The Sociology of Science.

Critiques and empirical research

Barnes and Dolby (1970) criticized Merton's norms as closer to science's idealized self-image than an account of actual scientific practice. Interviewing the lunar scientists of the Apollo program, Mitroff (1974) found that they also followed counter-norms, such as strong emotional commitment to their own hypotheses, particularism and secrecy, and were ambivalent between the two sets of norms. Mulkay (1976) argued that scientific norms function less to govern behavior than as an ideology scientists use to justify their activities to outsiders. Ziman (2000) described today's industrialized research as PLACE, meaning proprietary, local, authoritarian, commissioned and expert, in contrast to CUDOS. In a large survey of US scientists, Anderson, Martinson and De Vries (2007) found normative dissonance: most scientists endorsed Merton's norms but perceived their colleagues' actual behavior as closer to the counter-norms, and Anderson and colleagues (2010) reported similar results. Macfarlane and Cheng (2008) likewise reported mixed support for the norms among today's academics. Together with the debate over scientific revolutions and paradigm shifts, this work laid the foundation for understanding science as a social institution.

FAQ

What are the Mertonian norms in simple terms?

They're four principles the scientific community is meant to follow: share knowledge with everyone, judge claims by their content rather than by who made them, put truth ahead of personal gain, and rigorously test every claim.

Do scientists actually follow these norms today?

Surveys show that most scientists endorse them, but competition and commercialization also bring opposing tendencies such as secrecy and conflicts of interest. The gap between the norms and actual behavior has therefore become a major topic in research ethics.

Sources reviewed: 2026-10-26

References

1. Merton, R. K. (1938). Science and the social order. Philosophy of Science, 5(3), 321–337.
2. Merton, R. K. (1942). A note on science and democracy. Journal of Legal and Political Sociology, 1, 115–126.
3. Merton, R. K. (1957). Priorities in scientific discovery: A chapter in the sociology of science. American Sociological Review, 22(6), 635–659.
4. Merton, R. K. (1968). The Matthew effect in science. Science, 159(3810), 56–63.
5. Barnes, S. B., & Dolby, R. G. A. (1970). The scientific ethos: A deviant viewpoint. European Journal of Sociology, 11(1), 3–25.
6. Merton, R. K. (1973). The Sociology of Science: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations (N. W. Storer, Ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
7. Mitroff, I. I. (1974). Norms and counter-norms in a select group of the Apollo moon scientists: A case study of the ambivalence of scientists. American Sociological Review, 39(4), 579–595.
8. Mulkay, M. (1976). Norms and ideology in science. Social Science Information, 15(4–5), 637–656.
9. Dasgupta, P., & David, P. A. (1994). Toward a new economics of science. Research Policy, 23(5), 487–521.
10. Ziman, J. (2000). Real Science: What It Is, and What It Means. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
11. Anderson, M. S., Martinson, B. C., & De Vries, R. (2007). Normative dissonance in science: Results from a national survey of U.S. scientists. Journal of Empirical Research on Human Research Ethics, 2(4), 3–14.
12. Macfarlane, B., & Cheng, M. (2008). Communism, universalism and disinterestedness: Re-examining contemporary support among academics for Merton's scientific norms. Journal of Academic Ethics, 6(1), 67–78.
13. Anderson, M. S., Ronning, E. A., De Vries, R., & Martinson, B. C. (2010). Extending the Mertonian norms: Scientists' subscription to norms of research. Journal of Higher Education, 81(3), 366–393.