Basic principles
Brams and Fishburn (1978) analyzed a method in which voters choose a set of approved candidates and showed that with three candidates sincere expression of preferences is generally strategically rational as well. Under plurality rule, two similar candidates can split the vote and both lose, but approval voting reduces this problem because voters can approve both. Brams and Fishburn (1983) developed the analysis in book form.
Comparison with other methods
Fishburn and Brams (1981) argued that approval voting tends to elect the Condorcet winner, who beats every rival head-to-head, more reliably than runoff elections. Yet such a winner may not exist, as the Condorcet paradox shows, and as Arrow's impossibility theorem shows, no voting method satisfies every desirable condition. Approval voting still requires strategic judgment in deciding where to set the approval threshold (Cox, 1997).
Use and assessments
Brams and Fishburn (2005) reviewed how several professional societies adopted approval voting for officer elections and some later abandoned it, analyzing the gap between theory and practice. The handbook edited by Laslier and Sanver (2010) synthesizes experiments, field studies and theory. Adoption for local elections in some US cities has recently revived reform debates.
FAQ
- What is approval voting in simple terms?
- Instead of picking one candidate, you mark every candidate you would be happy with, and whoever gets the most marks wins.
- What are its advantages?
- It reduces vote splitting between similar candidates and makes it easier for broadly acceptable candidates to win.
Sources reviewed: 2026-10-26
References
- Brams, S. J., & Fishburn, P. C. (1978). Approval voting. American Political Science Review, 72(3), 831–847. The founding analysis.
- Brams, S. J., & Fishburn, P. C. (1983). Approval voting. Birkhäuser. The book-length treatment.
- Fishburn, P. C., & Brams, S. J. (1981). Approval voting, Condorcet's principle, and runoff elections. Public Choice, 36(1), 89–114. Comparison with runoffs and Condorcet.
- Brams, S. J., & Fishburn, P. C. (2005). Going from theory to practice: The mixed success of approval voting. Social Choice and Welfare, 25(2–3), 457–474. Approval voting in practice.
- Laslier, J.-F., & Sanver, M. R. (2010). Introduction to the handbook on approval voting. In J.-F. Laslier & M. R. Sanver (Eds.), Handbook on approval voting (pp. 1–12). Springer. Overview of the research field.
- Arrow, K. J. (1951). Social choice and individual values. Wiley. Social choice background.
- Cox, G. W. (1997). Making votes count: Strategic coordination in the world's electoral systems. Cambridge University Press. Strategic coordination.
