Audience Costs Theory

Fearon's model

Schelling (1960) argued that commitments that burn one's bridges make threats credible in bargaining. Fearon (1994) developed the idea into a game-theoretic model of international crises. The more publicly a crisis escalates, the greater the domestic cost, or audience cost, a leader pays for backing down, so a state facing high audience costs will escalate only when genuinely resolved. The opponent therefore finds the signal more credible. Fearon argued that democracies, with elections, a free press and opposition parties, can generate larger audience costs and so send more credible signals in crises. The logic connects to Fearon's (1995) rationalist explanations for war.

Democracies, autocracies and empirical research

Schultz (2001) argued that in democracies the decision of opposition parties to support or oppose a government's threats provides additional information and increases the effectiveness of coercive diplomacy. Partell and Palmer (1999) used crisis outcome data to give partial support to implications of Fearon's model. Tomz (2007) showed in survey experiments with American citizens that approval of a leader drops sharply when the leader threatens and then backs down. Weeks (2008) argued that autocracies can also generate audience costs when elite groups are able to punish the leader.

Critiques and refinements

Snyder and Borghard (2011) argued from historical cases that leaders try to avoid being locked into public commitments and that publics care more about outcomes than consistency. Trachtenberg (2012) likewise found little evidence that audience costs operated decisively in major Cold War crises, while Schultz (2012) defended the theory's value and proposed new directions. Levendusky and Horowitz (2012) reported that costs shrink when there is new information or when the leader shares the respondent's party. Kertzer and Brutger (2016) decomposed audience costs into punishment for inconsistency and punishment for belligerence. Together with Putnam's (1988) two-level games, the theory explains links between domestic politics and diplomacy.

FAQ

What is audience costs theory in simple terms?

A president who issues a strong public warning and then backs down is criticized at home, so a public warning tells the other country, credibly, that the president means it.

Do audience costs work in practice?

Survey experiments repeatedly find that approval falls for leaders who back down after a threat, but researchers disagree about whether audience costs were decisive in historical cases.

Sources reviewed: 2026-10-26

References

1. Fearon, J. D. (1994). Domestic political audiences and the escalation of international disputes. American Political Science Review, 88(3), 577–592.
2. Fearon, J. D. (1995). Rationalist explanations for war. International Organization, 49(3), 379–414.
3. Schelling, T. C. (1960). The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
4. Schultz, K. A. (2001). Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
5. Tomz, M. (2007). Domestic audience costs in international relations: An experimental approach. International Organization, 61(4), 821–840.
6. Weeks, J. L. (2008). Autocratic audience costs: Regime type and signaling resolve. International Organization, 62(1), 35–64.
7. Snyder, J., & Borghard, E. D. (2011). The cost of empty threats: A penny, not a pound. American Political Science Review, 105(3), 437–456.
8. Trachtenberg, M. (2012). Audience costs: An historical analysis. Security Studies, 21(1), 3–42.
9. Schultz, K. A. (2012). Why we needed audience costs and what we need now. Security Studies, 21(3), 369–375.
10. Levendusky, M. S., & Horowitz, M. C. (2012). When backing down is the right decision: Partisanship, new information, and audience costs. Journal of Politics, 74(2), 323–338.
11. Partell, P. J., & Palmer, G. (1999). Audience costs and interstate crises: An empirical assessment of Fearon's model of dispute outcomes. International Studies Quarterly, 43(2), 389–405.
12. Kertzer, J. D., & Brutger, R. (2016). Decomposing audience costs: Bringing the audience back into audience cost theory. American Journal of Political Science, 60(1), 234–249.
13. Putnam, R. D. (1988). Diplomacy and domestic politics: The logic of two-level games. International Organization, 42(3), 427–460.