Concept and difference from ideological polarization
Iyengar and colleagues (2012) noted that while Americans' policy positions had not diverged much, feelings toward the opposing party had sharply worsened. They called this polarization of affect, not ideology, and explained it with social identity theory, treating parties as social groups. Affective polarization is often measured with feeling thermometers from 0 to 100 that capture the gap between ratings of one's own and the other party, or by asking how upset people would be if their child married a supporter of the other party.
Causes: aligned identities and media
Mason (2018) argued that as racial, religious and regional identities aligned with party identity, political conflict became an us-versus-them identity contest. Abramowitz and Webster (2016) showed the rise of negative partisanship, voting against the disliked party rather than for one's own. Partisan media and social media, negative campaign advertising and elite conflict are also cited as causes. This connects with group polarization, in which like-minded people push one another toward more extreme views.
Consequences and comparative research
Iyengar and Westwood (2015) showed experimentally that people discriminate against opposing partisans in scholarship selection and trust games, sometimes more than on the basis of race. Druckman and colleagues (2021) reported that more affectively polarized people split along party lines in responses to crises such as COVID-19. Iyengar and colleagues (2019) concluded that affective polarization erodes political trust and compromise. Reiljan (2020) showed the phenomenon also appears in European multiparty systems, with large differences across countries. Critics caution that some measures may exaggerate its size.
FAQ
- What is affective polarization in simple terms?
- It is the growth of dislike and distrust toward the other party and its supporters, more than differences over policy.
- How does it differ from ideological polarization?
- Ideological polarization means policy positions moving apart, while affective polarization means feelings toward the other side worsening regardless of positions.
Sources reviewed: 2026-10-26
References
- Iyengar, S., Sood, G., & Lelkes, Y. (2012). Affect, not ideology: A social identity perspective on polarization. Public Opinion Quarterly, 76(3), 405–431. The article that introduced affective polarization.
- Iyengar, S., & Westwood, S. J. (2015). Fear and loathing across party lines: New evidence on group polarization. American Journal of Political Science, 59(3), 690–707. Shows partisan discrimination can exceed racial discrimination.
- Abramowitz, A. I., & Webster, S. (2016). The rise of negative partisanship and the nationalization of U.S. elections in the 21st century. Electoral Studies, 41, 12–22. On negative partisanship and its electoral effects.
- Mason, L. (2018). Uncivil Agreement: How Politics Became Our Identity. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Explains how aligned social identities intensify partisan animosity.
- Iyengar, S., Lelkes, Y., Levendusky, M., Malhotra, N., & Westwood, S. J. (2019). The origins and consequences of affective polarization in the United States. Annual Review of Political Science, 22, 129–146. A review of causes and consequences.
- Reiljan, A. (2020). 'Fear and loathing across party lines' (also) in Europe: Affective polarisation in European party systems. European Journal of Political Research, 59(2), 376–396. Measures affective polarization in European multiparty systems.
- Druckman, J. N., Klar, S., Krupnikov, Y., Levendusky, M., & Ryan, J. B. (2021). Affective polarization, local contexts and public opinion in America. Nature Human Behaviour, 5(1), 28–38. Links affective polarization to policy attitudes during COVID-19.