Simon and satisficing
In Administrative Behavior (1947) Herbert Simon wrote that people in organizations are "intendedly rational, but only limitedly so." Economic models of rational choice assume decision makers know all alternatives and outcomes and maximize expected utility, but Simon (1955, 1956) pointed out that real decision makers face costly information and limited computation. They therefore "satisfice": they examine options one by one and pick the first that exceeds an aspiration level. He likened the problem to a pair of scissors whose two blades are human cognitive capacities and the structure of the environment; behavior can be understood only by looking at both. Simon received the Nobel Prize in economics in 1978.
Spread to organization theory and economics
March and Simon (1958) argued that organizations compensate for individual cognitive limits through standard operating procedures and division of labor, and Cyert and March (1963) built a behavioral theory of the firm in which firms satisfice across multiple goals rather than maximize profit, searching for solutions only when problems arise. Oliver Williamson (1975) made the impossibility of writing complete contracts under bounded rationality a starting point of transaction cost economics. Conlisk (1996) set out why economics should incorporate bounded rationality. Christopher Sims's (2003) theory of "rational inattention" brought the idea into macroeconomics by modeling people with limited information-processing capacity who optimally choose what to attend to.
Heuristics: bias or adaptation?
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) launched the "heuristics and biases" program, showing that simple rules such as availability, representativeness and anchoring and adjustment produce systematic errors; Kahneman (2003) presented this as a map of bounded rationality. The program led to prospect theory and nudge policies. Gerd Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996), by contrast, stressed Simon's ecological view, arguing that "fast and frugal heuristics" can be more accurate than complex calculation in uncertain environments; Gigerenzer and Selten (2001) called this the "adaptive toolbox." More recently Lieder and Griffiths (2020) proposed "resource-rational" analysis, treating judgment as the best use of limited cognitive resources and bridging the two views.
FAQ
- Does bounded rationality mean people are irrational?
- No. It means people try to be rational in pursuing their goals but do so within limits of information and computation, which is distinct from irrationality.
- What is satisficing?
- A decision strategy of choosing the first option that meets a preset aspiration level instead of comparing all options to find the best. Simon coined the word from "satisfy" and "suffice."
Sources reviewed: 2026-10-26
References
- Simon, H. A. (1947). Administrative Behavior. New York: Macmillan.
- Simon, H. A. (1955). A behavioral model of rational choice. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 69(1), 99–118.
- Simon, H. A. (1956). Rational choice and the structure of the environment. Psychological Review, 63(2), 129–138.
- March, J. G., & Simon, H. A. (1958). Organizations. New York: Wiley.
- Cyert, R. M., & March, J. G. (1963). A Behavioral Theory of the Firm. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Science, 185(4157), 1124–1131.
- Williamson, O. E. (1975). Markets and Hierarchies. New York: Free Press.
- Conlisk, J. (1996). Why bounded rationality? Journal of Economic Literature, 34(2), 669–700.
- Gigerenzer, G., & Goldstein, D. G. (1996). Reasoning the fast and frugal way: Models of bounded rationality. Psychological Review, 103(4), 650–669.
- Gigerenzer, G., & Selten, R. (Eds.). (2001). Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Kahneman, D. (2003). Maps of bounded rationality: Psychology for behavioral economics. American Economic Review, 93(5), 1449–1475.
- Sims, C. A. (2003). Implications of rational inattention. Journal of Monetary Economics, 50(3), 665–690.
- Lieder, F., & Griffiths, T. L. (2020). Resource-rational analysis. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 43, e1.
