Concept and origins
Analyzing Southeast Asian politics, Scott (1972) conceptualized patron-client politics as an unequal reciprocal relationship in which a better-resourced patron provides protection and benefits and the client repays with loyalty and support. Kitschelt (2000) distinguished clientelistic, programmatic and charismatic linkages between citizens and politicians, defining clientelism's core as direct exchange in which benefits depend on support.
How it works
Clientelistic exchange faces a problem: under the secret ballot it is hard to verify that voters keep their side of the bargain. Using Argentina, Stokes (2005) argued that clientelism persists when parties have dense local organizations able to monitor and punish voters, calling this perverse accountability because parties hold voters accountable rather than the reverse. Stokes and colleagues (2013) analyzed how local brokers pursue their own interests in distributing resources.
Evidence and implications
Wantchekon (2003) reported from a field experiment in real campaigns in Benin that clientelist promises won more votes than programmatic ones. Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) compared how economic development and party competition shape the extent of clientelism. Hicken (2011) reviewed work showing that clientelism reduces public goods provision and weakens democratic accountability.
FAQ
- What is clientelism in simple terms?
- A trade in which politicians give personal benefits such as jobs, money or services and receive votes and support in return.
- Why is it a problem for democracy?
- Benefits go selectively to supporters rather than through policies for everyone, and politicians end up monitoring voters instead of voters judging politicians, which weakens accountability.
Sources reviewed: 2026-10-26
References
- Scott, J. C. (1972). Patron-client politics and political change in Southeast Asia. American Political Science Review, 66(1), 91–113. The classic patron-client analysis.
- Kitschelt, H. (2000). Linkages between citizens and politicians in democratic polities. Comparative Political Studies, 33(6–7), 845–879. Clientelistic versus programmatic linkages.
- Wantchekon, L. (2003). Clientelism and voting behavior: Evidence from a field experiment in Benin. World Politics, 55(3), 399–422. Field experiment in Benin.
- Stokes, S. C. (2005). Perverse accountability: A formal model of machine politics with evidence from Argentina. American Political Science Review, 99(3), 315–325. Perverse accountability.
- Kitschelt, H., & Wilkinson, S. I. (Eds.). (2007). Patrons, clients, and policies: Patterns of democratic accountability and political competition. Cambridge University Press. Comparative volume.
- Hicken, A. (2011). Clientelism. Annual Review of Political Science, 14, 289–310. Comprehensive review.
- Stokes, S. C., Dunning, T., Nazareno, M., & Brusco, V. (2013). Brokers, voters, and clientelism: The puzzle of distributive politics. Cambridge University Press. The role of brokers.