From the paradox
The paradox of voting led Riker and Ordeshook (1968) to add civic duty; Fiorina (1976) distinguished instrumental and expressive aspects.
Voting as cheering
Brennan and Buchanan (1984) and Brennan and Lomasky (1993) likened voting to cheering; Schuessler (2000) linked it to identity.
Implications
Expressive voting may favour costly moral policies and deviate from the median voter prediction; Hillman (2010) and Hamlin and Jennings (2011) assess it, while economic voting shows outcome concerns too.
FAQ
- What is it in simple terms?
- Voting to show who you are, like cheering for a team.
- Why does it matter for policy?
- Voters may back policies whose costs they do not personally bear.
Sources reviewed: 2026-10-26
References
- Riker, W. H., & Ordeshook, P. C. (1968). A theory of the calculus of voting. American Political Science Review, 62(1), 25–42. Introduced the civic-duty term in the calculus of voting.
- Fiorina, M. P. (1976). The voting decision: Instrumental and expressive aspects. Journal of Politics, 38(2), 390–413. An early statement of the instrumental–expressive distinction.
- Brennan, G., & Buchanan, J. (1984). Voter choice: Evaluating political alternatives. American Behavioral Scientist, 28(2), 185–201. Likens voting to cheering at a game.
- Brennan, G., & Lomasky, L. (1993). Democracy and decision: The pure theory of electoral preference. Cambridge University Press. The definitive book-length treatment.
- Schuessler, A. A. (2000). A logic of expressive choice. Princeton University Press. Links expressive choice to identity.
- Hillman, A. L. (2010). Expressive behavior in economics and politics. European Journal of Political Economy, 26(4), 403–418. A broad review of expressive behaviour.
- Hamlin, A., & Jennings, C. (2011). Expressive political behaviour: Foundations, scope and implications. British Journal of Political Science, 41(3), 645–670. Foundations and implications.