The classic model
Rabushka and Shepsle (1972) argued that multiethnic societies often begin independence with broad multiethnic coalition parties, but parties championing particular ethnic groups soon appear. Competition for support within the same group pushes parties to make more extreme demands than their rivals, making compromise difficult and democracy unstable. The process intensifies when social identities become the main axis of political competition.
Elites and escalation
Horowitz (1985) observed that in ethnic party systems elections become little more than a census. Gagnon (1994) analyzed how Serbian elites stoked nationalism to keep domestic power, and Kaufman (1996) showed how interaction between elites and masses spiraled into civil war in Moldova. Such work connects to realistic conflict theory, in which group competition breeds hostility, and to debates on affective polarization.
Rebuttals and conditions
Chandra (2005) argued that ethnic parties do not always produce instability and can even stabilize democracy when ethnic identities are multidimensional and institutions flexible. Mitchell, Evans and O'Leary (2009) found that Northern Ireland's parties became 'tribune parties' that vigorously represent their community's interests rather than making extreme demands. Zuber and Szöcsik (2015) traced minority party extremism to nested competition within and across ethnic arenas. Institutionalized power sharing under consociational democracy is often discussed as a remedy.
FAQ
- What is ethnic outbidding in simple terms?
- Parties chasing the same ethnic group's votes compete to look like its strongest defender, becoming ever more hardline until compromise is hard.
- Is outbidding inevitable?
- Not necessarily. Parties have moderated in cases like Northern Ireland, and institutions such as power sharing can ease the competition.
Sources reviewed: 2026-10-26
References
- Rabushka, A., & Shepsle, K. A. (1972). Politics in plural societies: A theory of democratic instability. Charles E. Merrill. The original outbidding model.
- Horowitz, D. L. (1985). Ethnic groups in conflict. University of California Press. Ethnic parties and conflict.
- Chandra, K. (2005). Ethnic parties and democratic stability. Perspectives on Politics, 3(2), 235–252. A rebuttal on conditions.
- Mitchell, P., Evans, G., & O'Leary, B. (2009). Extremist outbidding in ethnic party systems is not inevitable: Tribune parties in Northern Ireland. Political Studies, 57(2), 397–421. Tribune parties in Northern Ireland.
- Zuber, C. I., & Szöcsik, E. (2015). Ethnic outbidding and nested competition: Explaining the extremism of ethnonational minority parties in Europe. European Journal of Political Research, 54(4), 784–801. Nested competition in Europe.
- Gagnon, V. P. (1994). Ethnic nationalism and international conflict: The case of Serbia. International Security, 19(3), 130–166. Elite-driven conflict in Serbia.
- Kaufman, S. J. (1996). Spiraling to ethnic war: Elites, masses, and Moscow in Moldova's civil war. International Security, 21(2), 108–138. Escalation to ethnic war.