The pattern
Married men earn roughly 10–20% more; women face a motherhood penalty instead (Korenman & Neumark, 1992).
Three explanations
Becker (1973, 1981) stressed specialisation and human capital; others stress selection or employer signalling and preferences.
Evidence
Hersch and Stratton (2000) and Antonovics and Town (2004) find premiums persist; Killewald and Gough (2013) and McDonald (2020) point to several mechanisms.
FAQ
- What is it in simple terms?
- Married men tend to earn more than similar single men.
- Does marriage make men more productive?
- Partly, but selection and employer preferences also matter.
Sources reviewed: 2026-10-26
References
- Becker, G. S. (1973). A theory of marriage: Part I. Journal of Political Economy, 81(4), 813–846. The economic theory of marriage underlying the specialisation explanation.
- Becker, G. S. (1981). A treatise on the family. Harvard University Press. Systematises household specialisation and human-capital investment.
- Korenman, S., & Neumark, D. (1992). Marriage, motherhood, and wages. Journal of Human Resources, 27(2), 233–255. Shows marriage and motherhood affect men's and women's wages differently.
- Hersch, J., & Stratton, L. S. (2000). Household specialization and the male marriage wage premium. ILR Review, 54(1), 78–94. Tests the specialisation story using direct housework measures.
- Antonovics, K., & Town, R. (2004). Are all the good men married? Uncovering the sources of the marital wage premium. American Economic Review, 94(2), 317–321. Uses twins to control for selection into marriage.
- Killewald, A., & Gough, M. (2013). Does specialization explain marriage penalties and premiums? American Sociological Review, 78(3), 477–502. Analyses women's penalties and men's premiums together.
- McDonald, P. (2020). The male marriage premium: Selection, productivity, or employer preferences? Journal of Marriage and Family, 82(5), 1553–1570. A recent comparison of selection, productivity and employer-preference explanations.