Concept and classic studies
Ferejohn (1974) showed that US rivers and harbors spending followed committee power and district politics more than economic need. Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen (1981) proposed the 'law of 1/n': each legislator enjoys all local benefits but bears only 1/n of costs, so project size grows with the number of districts. This links to public choice and rent-seeking.
Who gets the pork?
Cox and McCubbins (1986) argued that risk-averse parties reward reliable core supporters, while Dixit and Londregan (1996) showed when ideologically flexible swing voters gain more. Evans (2004) showed that leaders hand out projects to build majorities for other bills, making pork a tool of logrolling and coalition-building.
Electoral effects and critiques
Levitt and Snyder (1997) found that federal spending raises incumbents' vote shares. Electoral systems that encourage the personal vote tend to boost pork. Golden and Min (2013) note that in developing countries it overlaps with clientelism. Pork is criticised as wasteful, but defenders say it reflects local needs and eases compromise.
FAQ
- What is pork-barrel politics in simple terms?
- Legislators bringing projects such as bridges, roads and buildings to their districts to help win re-election.
- What is the law of 1/n?
- Because districts get all the benefits but share costs nationally, project size grows with the number of legislators.
Sources reviewed: 2026-10-26
References
- Ferejohn, J. A. (1974). Pork barrel politics: Rivers and harbors legislation, 1947–1968. Stanford University Press. The classic study of US rivers and harbors spending.
- Weingast, B. R., Shepsle, K. A., & Johnsen, C. (1981). The political economy of benefits and costs: A neoclassical approach to distributive politics. Journal of Political Economy, 89(4), 642–664. The 'law of 1/n' model of distributive politics.
- Cox, G. W., & McCubbins, M. D. (1986). Electoral politics as a redistributive game. The Journal of Politics, 48(2), 370–389. Parties reward core supporters in redistributive games.
- Dixit, A., & Londregan, J. (1996). The determinants of success of special interests in redistributive politics. The Journal of Politics, 58(4), 1132–1155. Core versus swing voters as targets of redistribution.
- Levitt, S. D., & Snyder, J. M., Jr. (1997). The impact of federal spending on House election outcomes. Journal of Political Economy, 105(1), 30–53. Federal spending raises incumbents' vote shares.
- Evans, D. (2004). Greasing the wheels: Using pork barrel projects to build majority coalitions in Congress. Cambridge University Press. Pork as a tool for building legislative coalitions.
- Golden, M., & Min, B. (2013). Distributive politics around the world. Annual Review of Political Science, 16, 73–99. A global review of distributive politics research.