Private vs public
Kuran (1987, 1995) weighs expressive benefits against reputational costs; widespread falsification breeds pluralistic ignorance.
Surprise revolutions
With heterogeneous thresholds, small shocks trigger cascades; Kuran (1989, 1991) explains 1989 this way, close to the spiral of silence.
Measurement
It resembles social desirability bias. Jiang and Yang (2016) measured it in China; Bursztyn et al. (2020) showed election signals unlock hidden views.
FAQ
- What is it in simple terms?
- Saying what others expect rather than what you really think, at a societal scale.
- Why are revolutions hard to predict?
- Opposition stays hidden, so regimes look stable until a cascade starts.
Sources reviewed: 2026-10-26
References
- Kuran, T. (1987). Chameleon voters and public choice. Public Choice, 53(1), 53–78. An early model of voters who adapt public positions to social pressure.
- Kuran, T. (1989). Sparks and prairie fires: A theory of unanticipated political revolution. Public Choice, 61(1), 41–74. Explains surprise revolutions through hidden preferences and thresholds.
- Kuran, T. (1991). Now out of never: The element of surprise in the East European revolution of 1989. World Politics, 44(1), 7–48. The landmark application to the 1989 East European revolutions.
- Kuran, T. (1995). Private truths, public lies: The social consequences of preference falsification. Harvard University Press. The full book-length statement, including effects on knowledge and institutions.
- Noelle-Neumann, E. (1974). The spiral of silence: A theory of public opinion. Journal of Communication, 24(2), 43–51. A neighbouring theory of silence from fear of isolation, useful for comparison.
- Jiang, J., & Yang, D. L. (2016). Lying or believing? Measuring preference falsification from a political purge in China. Comparative Political Studies, 49(5), 600–634. Measures falsification using opinion shifts around a Chinese purge.
- Bursztyn, L., Egorov, G., & Fiorin, S. (2020). From extreme to mainstream: The erosion of social norms. American Economic Review, 110(11), 3522–3548. Experiments showing election results unlock public expression of hidden views.