Concept and origins
The security dilemma was named by the political scientist John Herz (1950). In an anarchic international system with no central authority, each state must provide for its own safety and so builds up its military. Others cannot be sure of its intentions and respond in kind, leaving everyone less secure than before. Around the same time the historian Herbert Butterfield (1951) described an "absolute predicament": because states cannot see into each other's minds, even well-meaning powers can drift into tragic conflict.
Why it is a dilemma
- Uncertainty about intentions: defensive weapons can also be used to attack, and today's benign intentions may not last.
- Concern for relative gains: a rival's growing power is read as one's own relative decline.
- The spiral model: one side's measure prompts a countermeasure, which prompts a bigger measure, feeding arms races and crises.
Rational efforts to become safer thus produce a collectively irrational outcome. Because cooperation would benefit all but the risk of being exploited blocks it, the security dilemma is often compared to the prisoner's dilemma.
Jervis's offense–defense balance
Robert Jervis (1978) explained the intensity of the dilemma with two variables.
- Offense–defense balance: when technology and geography favor attack, the temptation to strike first grows and the dilemma sharpens; when defense has the advantage, it eases.
- Offense–defense distinguishability: if defensive and offensive weapons can be told apart, states can signal benign intent by adopting purely defensive postures.
A world where offense has the advantage and weapons are indistinguishable is the most dangerous; one where defense dominates and postures are distinguishable is the most stable. This framework became a foundation of defensive realism, and Glaser (1997) showed that the dilemma's severity depends on information about the other side's motives.
Examples
- Before World War I: a classic reading holds that the great powers believed offense was dominant (the "cult of the offensive") and raced to mobilize, turning a crisis into war.
- The Cold War nuclear arms race: even missile defenses were seen as offensive because they could neutralize the other side's retaliation, which is why the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty limited them.
- East Asia: differing perceptions of the THAAD deployment in South Korea and naval buildups amid maritime disputes are often analyzed through the security dilemma.
Mitigation and criticism
Confidence-building measures (CBMs), arms control treaties, advance notice of exercises, mutual inspections and defensive force postures are proposed as ways to ease the dilemma. Booth and Wheeler (2008) argued that "security dilemma sensibility", seeing the situation from the other side's perspective, and trust are key to transcending it. Efforts to broaden security beyond military threats are discussed under comprehensive security. Offensive realists counter that states often do have expansionist aims, so conflict born of "misunderstanding" is overstated, while constructivists stress that threat perceptions are themselves shaped by identities and interaction.
References
- Herz, J. H. (1950). Idealist internationalism and the security dilemma. World Politics, 2(2), 157–180.
- Butterfield, H. (1951). History and Human Relations. London: Collins.
- Jervis, R. (1978). Cooperation under the security dilemma. World Politics, 30(2), 167–214.
- Glaser, C. L. (1997). The security dilemma revisited. World Politics, 50(1), 171–201.
- Booth, K., & Wheeler, N. J. (2008). The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.