Origins in evolutionary game theory
Maynard Smith (1974) modeled contests in which animals face off through displays rather than actual fighting. Each chooses how long to persist; the one that lasts longer wins the resource, but both pay costs proportional to the length of the standoff. A pure strategy of holding out for a fixed time is not evolutionarily stable; instead, the evolutionarily stable strategy is a mixed strategy that picks a random persistence time from an exponential distribution, and in this equilibrium the expected value of the resource is entirely dissipated in costs. Bishop and Cannings (1978) generalized the model, and Parker (1974) analyzed the role of strategies that assess an opponent's strength. The game can be seen as a game of chicken stretched over time.
Applications in economics and industrial organization
Hendricks, Weiss and Wilson (1988) systematically characterized equilibria of the continuous-time war of attrition with complete information. In industrial organization, Ghemawat and Nalebuff (1985) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1986) explained exit races in declining oligopolies, where firms absorb losses while waiting for a rival to leave first, as wars of attrition. Bulow and Klemperer (1999) analyzed a generalized war of attrition among many firms, as in standards battles, linking it to all-pay auctions like the dollar auction. Bilodeau and Slivinski (1996) applied the same structure to the question of who volunteers first to provide a public service.
Political economy and conflict
Alesina and Drazen (1991) explained why reforms that everyone needs, such as cutting budget deficits, are delayed: each group waits for the others to accept the burden first, in a war of attrition. The model is widely cited in research on delayed reform and political polarization. Kennan and Wilson (1989) interpreted long strikes as wars of attrition in bargaining with incomplete information, and Fearon (1995), analyzing rationalist explanations for war, discussed protracted fighting as a process that reveals each side's resolve.
FAQ
- What is the war of attrition in simple terms?
- Two sides hold out for something they both want. The longer they last, the more both lose, and whoever gives up first loses the prize.
- Where is the war of attrition used?
- It helps explain animal territorial contests, firms in declining industries waiting for rivals to exit first, delayed fiscal reform, strike bargaining and protracted conflicts.
Sources reviewed: 2026-10-26
References
- Maynard Smith, J. (1974). The theory of games and the evolution of animal conflicts. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 47(1), 209–221.
- Bishop, D. T., & Cannings, C. (1978). A generalized war of attrition. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 70(1), 85–124.
- Maynard Smith, J. (1982). Evolution and the Theory of Games. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Parker, G. A. (1974). Assessment strategy and the evolution of fighting behaviour. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 47(1), 223–243.
- Hendricks, K., Weiss, A., & Wilson, C. (1988). The war of attrition in continuous time with complete information. International Economic Review, 29(4), 663–680.
- Fudenberg, D., & Tirole, J. (1986). A theory of exit in duopoly. Econometrica, 54(4), 943–960.
- Ghemawat, P., & Nalebuff, B. (1985). Exit. RAND Journal of Economics, 16(2), 184–194.
- Alesina, A., & Drazen, A. (1991). Why are stabilizations delayed? American Economic Review, 81(5), 1170–1188.
- Bulow, J., & Klemperer, P. (1999). The generalized war of attrition. American Economic Review, 89(1), 175–189.
- Kennan, J., & Wilson, R. (1989). Strategic bargaining models and interpretation of strike data. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 4(S1), S87–S130.
- Fearon, J. D. (1995). Rationalist explanations for war. International Organization, 49(3), 379–414.
- Bilodeau, M., & Slivinski, A. (1996). Toilet cleaning and department chairing: Volunteering a public service. Journal of Public Economics, 59(2), 299–308.