Origins and structure
Russell (1959) pointed to a reckless driving stunt among 1950s youths and likened the U.S.–Soviet nuclear standoff to a game of chicken called brinkmanship. Rapoport and Chammah (1966) formalized it as a 2×2 game. The two outcomes in which one swerves and the other drives straight are each Nash equilibria, and if both drive straight the worst outcome, a crash, follows. So while the stag hunt is a problem of trust, chicken is a conflict over who yields. In the mixed-strategy equilibrium, where both randomize, a crash happens with some probability.
Commitment and brinkmanship
Schelling (1960, 1966) argued that in this game the side that first eliminates its own options wins: visibly throw the steering wheel out the window, an irreversible commitment, and the other driver has no choice but to swerve. He also stressed the threat that leaves something to chance, deliberately preserving a risk that events spin out of control. Kahn (1965) laid out the stages of crisis as an escalation ladder. Powell (1990) analyzed such competitions in risk-taking as the credibility problem of nuclear deterrence, and Fearon (1994) explained that the audience costs a leader pays at home for backing down make commitments believable.
Applications in IR and biology
Snyder (1971) and Snyder and Diesing (1977) compared many international crises, including the Cuban Missile Crisis, through chicken and prisoner's dilemma structures, and Brams (1985) applied the model to superpower confrontation. In biology, Maynard Smith and Price (1973) analyzed animal contests with the structurally identical hawk–dove game and introduced the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy. Aumann (1974) showed that a correlated equilibrium, in which players condition on a common signal such as a traffic light, can eliminate the risk of a crash and give both players more than the mixed equilibrium. Price wars and ruinous competition between firms are also commonly called games of chicken.
FAQ
- What is the game of chicken in simple terms?
- Two sides refuse to back down, and whoever yields first loses. If both hold out to the end, both suffer badly, which makes it a dangerous standoff.
- Is there a winning strategy in chicken?
- Schelling argued that the side that convinces the other, through an irreversible commitment, that it will never swerve has the edge. But if both sides do this, a crash can follow, which is what makes the game so dangerous.
Sources reviewed: 2026-10-26
References
- Russell, B. (1959). Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare. London: George Allen & Unwin.
- Schelling, T. C. (1960). The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Schelling, T. C. (1966). Arms and Influence. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Rapoport, A., & Chammah, A. M. (1966). The game of chicken. American Behavioral Scientist, 10(3), 10–28.
- Kahn, H. (1965). On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios. New York: Praeger.
- Snyder, G. H. (1971). 'Prisoner's dilemma' and 'chicken' models in international politics. International Studies Quarterly, 15(1), 66–103.
- Snyder, G. H., & Diesing, P. (1977). Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Maynard Smith, J., & Price, G. R. (1973). The logic of animal conflict. Nature, 246(5427), 15–18.
- Brams, S. J. (1985). Superpower Games: Applying Game Theory to Superpower Conflict. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Aumann, R. J. (1974). Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1(1), 67–96.
- Fearon, J. D. (1994). Domestic political audiences and the escalation of international disputes. American Political Science Review, 88(3), 577–592.
- Powell, R. (1990). Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.