Origins
Shleifer (1985) proposed benchmarking regulated firms; Salmon (1987) applied it to decentralised government.
Elections and taxes
Besley and Case (1995) showed voters punish governors who raise taxes above neighbours, adding a benchmark to retrospective voting; Bordignon and colleagues (2003) found it where elections are competitive.
Versus tax competition
Brueckner (2003) distinguished it from tax competition; unlike the Tiebout model it works through the ballot. Allers and Elhorst (2005) found Dutch evidence.
FAQ
- What is it in simple terms?
- Voters ask why their taxes are higher than next door's, so governments watch their neighbours.
- How is it different from tax competition?
- Tax competition chases mobile capital; yardstick competition follows voter comparisons.
Sources reviewed: 2026-10-26
References
- Shleifer, A. (1985). A theory of yardstick competition. RAND Journal of Economics, 16(3), 319–327. The original regulatory formulation.
- Salmon, P. (1987). Decentralisation as an incentive scheme. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 3(2), 24–43. Applies the idea to decentralised government.
- Besley, T., & Case, A. (1995). Incumbent behavior: Vote-seeking, tax-setting, and yardstick competition. American Economic Review, 85(1), 25–45. Key evidence that voters compare neighbouring tax rates.
- Brueckner, J. K. (2003). Strategic interaction among governments: An overview of empirical studies. International Regional Science Review, 26(2), 175–188. Distinguishes yardstick from other interactions.
- Bordignon, M., Cerniglia, F., & Revelli, F. (2003). In search of yardstick competition: A spatial analysis of Italian municipality property tax setting. Journal of Urban Economics, 54(2), 199–217. Shows the effect depends on electoral competition.
- Allers, M. A., & Elhorst, J. P. (2005). Tax mimicking and yardstick competition among local governments in the Netherlands. International Tax and Public Finance, 12(4), 493–513. Dutch evidence.
- Oates, W. E. (1972). Fiscal federalism. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. The classic on fiscal federalism.
