概述
选民以邻近政府为标准评价本地政府、使政府相互模仿的现象。
发展
与税收竞争相关。
评价
有实证与批评。
常见问题
- 标尺竞争是什么？
- 选民以邻近政府为标准评价本地政府、使政府相互模仿的现象。
- 为何重要？
- 有助于理解社会。
来源核查日期：2026-10-26
参考文献
- Shleifer, A. (1985). A theory of yardstick competition. RAND Journal of Economics, 16(3), 319–327. 阅读这篇文献有助于加深理解。
- Salmon, P. (1987). Decentralisation as an incentive scheme. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 3(2), 24–43. 阅读这篇文献有助于加深理解。
- Besley, T., & Case, A. (1995). Incumbent behavior: Vote-seeking, tax-setting, and yardstick competition. American Economic Review, 85(1), 25–45. 阅读这篇文献有助于加深理解。
- Brueckner, J. K. (2003). Strategic interaction among governments: An overview of empirical studies. International Regional Science Review, 26(2), 175–188. 阅读这篇文献有助于加深理解。
- Bordignon, M., Cerniglia, F., & Revelli, F. (2003). In search of yardstick competition: A spatial analysis of Italian municipality property tax setting. Journal of Urban Economics, 54(2), 199–217. 阅读这篇文献有助于加深理解。
- Allers, M. A., & Elhorst, J. P. (2005). Tax mimicking and yardstick competition among local governments in the Netherlands. International Tax and Public Finance, 12(4), 493–513. 阅读这篇文献有助于加深理解。
- Oates, W. E. (1972). Fiscal federalism. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. 阅读这篇文献有助于加深理解。