The logic of the theory
Diversionary war theory starts from the idea that leaders' domestic political interests shape foreign policy. When the economy sours, approval falls or a regime is threatened, a leader may provoke conflict with an external enemy to shift attention away from domestic problems. People tend to unite temporarily around the government when faced with external threats, which is known as the rally-round-the-flag effect. Another argument is that showing competence in a foreign crisis can prove a leader's qualities. The theory is also connected to the sociological idea that conflict with out-groups strengthens in-group cohesion.
Empirical research
Analyzing U.S. presidential uses of force, Ostrom and Job (1986) reported that domestic factors such as approval ratings, economic conditions and election timing affected decisions to use force. Many studies followed, with mixed results. Meernik and Waterman (1996) countered that evidence for diversionary uses of force was weak. However, Mitchell and Prins (2004) reported that leaders tend to use diversionary force against long-standing rivals, and Tir (2010) found that territorial disputes are especially effective at rallying the public and are therefore frequently used for diversion. Oneal and Tir (2006) reported that slower economic growth raises the likelihood of conflict for nondemocracies but does not seriously threaten the democratic peace.
Strategic interaction and rebuttals
Strategic interaction is cited as a reason for the mixed evidence. Using a game-theoretic model, Smith (1996) explained that because voters understand diversionary motives and rival states anticipate them and change their behavior, attempts at diversion may rarely be visible. Leeds and Davis (1997) argued that rivals may engage in strategic conflict avoidance, deliberately not provoking domestically vulnerable states. Chiozza and Goemans (2003) reported, conversely, that leaders at high risk of losing office may start fewer risky conflicts. Diversionary war theory is thus intuitively persuasive but requires attention to leaders' motives, regime type and rivals' responses. It is used alongside audience cost theory to understand how domestic politics relates to international conflict.
FAQ
- What is diversionary war theory in simple terms?
- It is the idea that when things go badly at home, leaders may pick fights with foreign enemies to distract the public and gain support, exploiting people's tendency to rally around the government in the face of external threats.
- Has diversionary war theory been proven?
- Not conclusively. Some studies find links between domestic trouble and uses of force, while others find weak evidence. Researchers also note that strategic responses, such as rivals avoiding states in crisis, make diversion hard to measure.
Sources reviewed: 2026-10-26
References
- Ostrom, C. W., & Job, B. L. (1986). The president and the political use of force. American Political Science Review, 80(2), 541–566. A classic empirical study linking approval and the economy to U.S. uses of force — the debate's starting point.
- Smith, A. (1996). Diversionary foreign policy in democratic systems. International Studies Quarterly, 40(1), 133–153. A game-theoretic model of leaders, voters and rivals — explains why diversion may be rarer than expected.
- Meernik, J., & Waterman, P. (1996). The myth of the diversionary use of force by American presidents. Political Research Quarterly, 49(3), 573–590. A skeptical rebuttal finding weak evidence of diversion — read for the other side.
- Leeds, B. A., & Davis, D. R. (1997). Domestic political vulnerability and international disputes. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 41(6), 814–834. Introduces strategic conflict avoidance by rivals — why the evidence is mixed.
- Chiozza, G., & Goemans, H. E. (2003). Peace through insecurity: Tenure and international conflict. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 47(4), 443–467. Finds insecure leaders may start fewer conflicts — a twist on the theory's prediction.
- Mitchell, S. M., & Prins, B. C. (2004). Rivalry and diversionary uses of force. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 48(6), 937–961. Shows rivals are convenient diversionary targets — who gets targeted.
- Oneal, J. R., & Tir, J. (2006). Does the diversionary use of force threaten the democratic peace? Assessing the effect of economic growth on interstate conflict, 1921–2001. International Studies Quarterly, 50(4), 755–779. Links economic slowdowns, diversion and the democratic peace — good for connecting the two theories.
- Tir, J. (2010). Territorial diversion: Diversionary theory of war and territorial conflict. The Journal of Politics, 72(2), 413–425. Territorial disputes as especially effective diversion — a concrete form of the theory.