Concept and theoretical background
Schelling (1960, 1966) analyzed how appearing less than rational can sometimes be an advantage in bargaining and coercion. If an adversary believes that a leader might really do something dangerous, the credibility of threats rises and the adversary becomes more likely to back down. Schelling called deliberately creating a risk that events might spin out of control in order to pressure an opponent the manipulation of risk. The logic resembles throwing away the steering wheel in a game of chicken. The madman theory applies this logic of deterrence and coercion to a leader's personal image.
Nixon and the secret 1969 nuclear alert
According to the recollection of Nixon's aide H. R. Haldeman, Nixon wanted North Vietnam to believe he might do anything to end the war. Analyzing declassified documents, Sagan and Suri (2003) reported that the secret raising of U.S. nuclear alert levels in October 1969, including arming nuclear bombers, was an attempt to signal Nixon's unpredictability to the Soviet Union and North Vietnam. Burr and Kimball (2015) traced this operation and Vietnam War diplomacy in detail. The signal, however, extracted no clear concessions from the Soviet Union and is judged to have mainly raised the risk of accidents.
Research and debate on effectiveness
Many studies are skeptical that the madman strategy works. Sechser and Fuhrmann (2017) found that threats from nuclear-armed states have rarely succeeded in coercion. McManus (2019) reported that effects depend on how a leader is perceived as mad: appearing to have extreme goals can make threats more credible, but appearing to lack judgment altogether can reduce the incentive to concede, because adversaries expect to be attacked anyway. Boys (2026) analyzed how the theory has been used in U.S. grand strategy from Nixon to Trump. The madman theory is used alongside audience cost theory and the bargaining model of war to understand the credibility of threats.
FAQ
- What is the madman theory in simple terms?
- It is a strategy in which a leader appears to be an unpredictable person capable of anything, so that adversaries make concessions to avoid the risk. It is famous as an approach President Nixon tried during the Vietnam War.
- Does the madman strategy actually work?
- Many studies find its effects unclear. Showing extreme resolve can help, but appearing to lack judgment may backfire, because adversaries conclude that concessions would not prevent an attack.
Sources reviewed: 2026-10-26
References
- Schelling, T. C. (1960). The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. The classic source on the strategic value of appearing to lose control.
- Schelling, T. C. (1966). Arms and Influence. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Coercion and the 'manipulation of risk' — the deterrence logic behind the madman strategy.
- Sagan, S. D., & Suri, J. (2003). The madman nuclear alert: Secrecy, signaling, and safety in October 1969. International Security, 27(4), 150–183. Declassified records of Nixon's secret 1969 nuclear alert — the key case.
- Burr, W., & Kimball, J. P. (2015). Nixon's Nuclear Specter: The Secret Alert of 1969, Madman Diplomacy, and the Vietnam War. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. A detailed history of Nixon's madman diplomacy and Vietnam.
- Sechser, T. S., & Fuhrmann, M. (2017). Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Finds nuclear weapons rarely help coercion — grounds for skepticism.
- McManus, R. W. (2019). Revisiting the madman theory: Evaluating the impact of different forms of perceived madness in coercive bargaining. Security Studies, 28(5), 976–1009. Different kinds of perceived madness have different effects — the most systematic test.
- Boys, J. D. (2026). US Grand Strategy and the Madman Theory. Manchester: Manchester University Press. A recent study from Nixon to Trump — connects the theory to current debates.