Concept and size
Non-take-up is measured as the share of eligible people who do not receive a benefit. Hernanz et al. (2004) found that in OECD countries only around 40 to 80 percent of eligible people often received means-tested assistance and housing benefits. Currie (2006) likewise shows lower take-up for selective than universal benefits.
Why people do not claim
Van Oorschot (1991) grouped causes at the individual level (lack of information, believing oneself ineligible, small expected gains), the administrative level (complex procedures, unwelcoming staff) and the scheme level (strict means tests, complex rules). Moffitt (1983) modelled stigma as a cost, so people claim only when benefits outweigh it. Lipsky (1984) described bureaucratic disentitlement, and Kleven and Kopczuk (2011) showed that complex rules designed for precise targeting can raise non-take-up.
Policy responses
Non-take-up weakens poverty reduction and leaves out those most in need. Bhargava and Manoli (2015) found that simpler, more salient notices increased claims. Responses include automatic payment, simplified applications, proactive identification using administrative data, outreach and less stigmatising universal design.
FAQ
- What is non-take-up in simple terms?
- It is when people entitled to benefits do not get them because they do not know, find it too hard to apply, or fear stigma.
- How can non-take-up be reduced?
- Automatic payment, simpler procedures, data-driven outreach and designs that reduce stigma.
Sources reviewed: 2026-10-26
References
- van Oorschot, W. (1991). Non-take-up of social security benefits in Europe. Journal of European Social Policy, 1(1), 15–30. A multi-level model of non-take-up across Europe.
- Moffitt, R. (1983). An economic model of welfare stigma. American Economic Review, 73(5), 1023–1035. An economic model treating stigma as a cost of claiming.
- Currie, J. (2006). The take-up of social benefits. In A. J. Auerbach, D. Card, & J. M. Quigley (Eds.), Public policy and the income distribution (pp. 80–148). Russell Sage Foundation. A wide review of evidence on benefit take-up.
- Hernanz, V., Malherbet, F., & Pellizzari, M. (2004). Take-up of welfare benefits in OECD countries: A review of the evidence (OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers No. 17). OECD Publishing. Compares take-up rates across OECD countries.
- Kleven, H. J., & Kopczuk, W. (2011). Transfer program complexity and the take-up of social benefits. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 3(1), 54–90. How programme complexity trades off targeting against take-up.
- Bhargava, S., & Manoli, D. (2015). Psychological frictions and the incomplete take-up of social benefits: Evidence from an IRS field experiment. American Economic Review, 105(11), 3489–3529. A field experiment on informational and psychological frictions.
- Lipsky, M. (1984). Bureaucratic disentitlement in social welfare programs. Social Service Review, 58(1), 3–27. How administration itself produces non-take-up.