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The Evolution of Cooperation (Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma)

👥 Sociology By CampusDown Wiki Editorial Team Last updated
Quick answer: Axelrod showed that self-interested players who meet repeatedly can sustain cooperation through reciprocal strategies such as tit for tat.
Contents
  1. 1. The dilemma and repetition
  2. 2. Why tit for tat won
  3. 3. Promoting cooperation
  4. 4. References

The dilemma and repetition

In a one-shot prisoner's dilemma, defecting is individually rational yet leaves both players worse off than mutual cooperation. In 1980 Axelrod invited researchers to submit strategies for a computer tournament to see whether repeated play changes the outcome.

Why tit for tat won

In both tournaments the simplest entry, tit for tat (cooperate first, then copy the partner's previous move), won. Successful strategies were:

  • Nice: never the first to defect.
  • Retaliatory: respond to defection at once.
  • Forgiving: return to cooperation when the other does.
  • Clear: easy for others to recognise and adapt to.

Promoting cooperation

Axelrod advised enlarging the "shadow of the future" through longer, more frequent interaction, changing payoffs and teaching reciprocity. Examples include the live-and-let-live truces of First World War trenches, biological symbiosis and international negotiation. Later work found generous tit for tat does better when mistakes occur, and multi-player problems are harder.

References

  1. Axelrod, R. (1984). The Evolution of Cooperation. Basic Books.
  2. Axelrod, R., & Hamilton, W. D. (1981). The evolution of cooperation. Science, 211(4489), 1390-1396.
  3. Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K. (1992). Tit for tat in heterogeneous populations. Nature, 355, 250-253.

Reports and materials that use this theory (Korean)

There are no materials dedicated to this theory yet, but you can search related reports in the CampusDown library (Korean).

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This article was last updated on October 15, 2026. It is based on widely recognized original works and textbooks; when citing it in a paper, please check the original sources listed in the references.