Uncertainty and specialization
Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987) modeled legislators who do not know the exact consequences of bills. If committees invest in expertise, the whole chamber can make better decisions, so legislatures adopt rules that encourage committee specialization. They interpreted restrictive closed rules as devices protecting committees' incentive to gather information. Because it deals with information asymmetry between committees and the floor, the theory resembles agency theory.
Key predictions
Gilligan and Krehbiel (1989) showed that a committee whose preferences differ sharply from the floor median may transmit information strategically. Krehbiel (1991) therefore predicted that committees should be composed of heterogeneous members representative of the floor and that preference outliers should be rare. He presented evidence that most US House committees were not very different from the chamber.
Rival theories and assessments
Distributive theory, in Weingast and Marshall (1988) and Shepsle and Weingast (1987), holds that members self-select onto committees tied to district interests and trade support. This fits the reelection motive of the electoral connection. Cox and McCubbins (1993) advanced a partisan theory of majority control, and Krehbiel (1993) countered that party effects were overstated. Current research tends to see each perspective as explaining different settings.
FAQ
- What is the informational theory in simple terms?
- Because a legislature cannot know everything, it sets up specialist committees to gather information and make better decisions.
- How does it differ from distributive theory?
- Distributive theory sees committees as deal-making devices for district benefits, while informational theory sees them as information-gathering devices for the whole chamber.
Sources reviewed: 2026-10-26
References
- Gilligan, T. W., & Krehbiel, K. (1987). Collective decisionmaking and standing committees: An informational rationale for restrictive amendment procedures. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 3(2), 287–335. The founding informational model.
- Gilligan, T. W., & Krehbiel, K. (1989). Asymmetric information and legislative rules with a heterogeneous committee. American Journal of Political Science, 33(2), 459–490. Heterogeneous committees and information.
- Krehbiel, K. (1991). Information and legislative organization. University of Michigan Press. The book-length synthesis.
- Weingast, B. R., & Marshall, W. J. (1988). The industrial organization of Congress; or, why legislatures, like firms, are not organized as markets. Journal of Political Economy, 96(1), 132–163. The distributive alternative.
- Shepsle, K. A., & Weingast, B. R. (1987). The institutional foundations of committee power. American Political Science Review, 81(1), 85–104. Sources of committee power.
- Cox, G. W., & McCubbins, M. D. (1993). Legislative leviathan: Party government in the House. University of California Press. The partisan alternative.
- Krehbiel, K. (1993). Where's the party? British Journal of Political Science, 23(2), 235–266. Questioning party effects.