Titmuss and the theory's origins
Comparing Britain's voluntary blood donation with America's paid market, Titmuss (1970) argued that paying donors can weaken altruism and reduce the quantity and quality of blood. Frey (1997) and Frey and Jegen (2001) developed this into economic theory: interventions perceived as controlling crowd out intrinsic motivation, while those perceived as supportive crowd it in, in line with self-determination theory.
Classic cases
Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997) found that offering compensation nearly halved Swiss residents' acceptance of a nuclear waste site. Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) showed that fining parents for late pickup at Israeli day-care centres increased lateness, because the fine turned guilt into a price. Deci et al. (1999) confirmed in a meta-analysis that contingent rewards undermine intrinsic motivation, and Mellström and Johannesson (2008) found that payment reduced blood donation among women.
Policy implications and critiques
Bowles and Polanía-Reyes (2012) show that incentives and social preferences can be substitutes or complements, so rewards and penalties need careful design where civic motives matter, as with public goods, volunteering and environmental behaviour. The theory has shaped behavioural economics and nudge debates. Its limit is that effect sizes and conditions vary, making crowding-out hard to predict.
FAQ
- What is motivation crowding in simple terms?
- Attaching money or fines to something people do willingly can erase the willingness and make them do less of it.
- Why did fines increase lateness?
- The fine turned a moral obligation into a price that parents could simply pay.
Sources reviewed: 2026-10-26
References
- Titmuss, R. M. (1970). The gift relationship: From human blood to social policy. Allen & Unwin. The classic arguing that paying for blood can crowd out donation.
- Frey, B. S. (1997). Not just for the money: An economic theory of personal motivation. Edward Elgar. Frey's book-length economic theory of motivation crowding.
- Frey, B. S., & Oberholzer-Gee, F. (1997). The cost of price incentives: An empirical analysis of motivation crowding-out. American Economic Review, 87(4), 746–755. Swiss evidence that compensation reduced acceptance of a nuclear waste site.
- Frey, B. S., & Jegen, R. (2001). Motivation crowding theory. Journal of Economic Surveys, 15(5), 589–611. A survey of the theory's conditions and evidence.
- Deci, E. L., Koestner, R., & Ryan, R. M. (1999). A meta-analytic review of experiments examining the effects of extrinsic rewards on intrinsic motivation. Psychological Bulletin, 125(6), 627–668. Meta-analysis showing extrinsic rewards can undermine intrinsic motivation.
- Gneezy, U., & Rustichini, A. (2000). A fine is a price. The Journal of Legal Studies, 29(1), 1–17. Day-care fines for late pickup increased lateness.
- Bowles, S., & Polanía-Reyes, S. (2012). Economic incentives and social preferences: Substitutes or complements? Journal of Economic Literature, 50(2), 368–425. Reviews when incentives and social preferences substitute or complement.
- Mellström, C., & Johannesson, M. (2008). Crowding out in blood donation: Was Titmuss right? Journal of the European Economic Association, 6(4), 845–863. A field experiment testing Titmuss's claim.
