Bureaucratic Politics Model

Three lenses

In a 1969 article and Essence of Decision (1971), Graham Allison reanalyzed the 1962 Cuban missile crisis through three conceptual lenses. Model I, the rational actor model, treats the state as a unitary actor with a single set of goals that chooses the value-maximizing option. Model II, the organizational process model, views government as a collection of semi-independent organizations whose decisions are products of standard operating procedures (SOPs) and existing repertoires, drawing on Simon's (1947) bounded rationality and Cyert and March's (1963) behavioral theory of the firm. Model III, the bureaucratic politics model, sees decisions as the result of a political game among individual players with different goals and power: the president, cabinet secretaries and military commanders. It echoes Richard Neustadt's (1960) insight that presidential power is the power to persuade.

Core propositions and the missile crisis

The model's signature proposition is "where you stand depends on where you sit." Defense and state secretaries looking at the same issue take different positions according to their departments' missions and interests. Outcomes tend to be compromises no one initially intended, and a player's influence depends on formal authority, information, persuasiveness and proximity to the president. Allison explained the US choice of a naval blockade over air strikes through debates and coalitions within the ExComm of the National Security Council. He also argued that odd Soviet behavior, such as failing to camouflage missile sites, was better explained by organizational routines than by rational calculation. Allison and Halperin (1972) and Halperin (1974) generalized the approach into a framework for foreign policy.

Critiques and influence

In a satirically titled essay, "Are Bureaucracies Important? (Or Allison Wonderland)," Stephen Krasner (1972) argued that the model obscures presidential responsibility and overstates bureaucrats, ignoring that presidents appoint officials and make final decisions. Robert Art (1973) argued that the theory lacks falsifiable propositions, and Bendor and Hammond (1992) found the distinctions among the three models logically loose. Welch (1992) judged the evidence for "where you stand depends on where you sit" to be mixed. Even so, the model became a standard tool for looking inside policymaking, and Allison and Zelikow (1999) revised it with declassified records. Like two-level game theory, it represents efforts to move beyond treating the state as a unitary actor, and it strongly influenced bureaucracy research and theories of policymaking in public administration.

FAQ

What is the bureaucratic politics model in simple terms?

Government decisions are not made rationally by one person but are compromises reached through pushing and pulling among senior officials whose departments have different interests.

What does "where you stand depends on where you sit" mean?

A person's policy position is often shaped less by personal belief than by the mission and interests of the department or post they hold.

Sources reviewed: 2026-10-26

References

1. Allison, G. T. (1969). Conceptual models and the Cuban missile crisis. American Political Science Review, 63(3), 689–718.
2. Allison, G. T. (1971). Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. Boston: Little, Brown.
3. Allison, G. T., & Zelikow, P. (1999). Essence of Decision (2nd ed.). New York: Longman.
4. Allison, G. T., & Halperin, M. H. (1972). Bureaucratic politics: A paradigm and some policy implications. World Politics, 24(S1), 40–79.
5. Halperin, M. H. (1974). Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
6. Neustadt, R. E. (1960). Presidential Power. New York: Wiley.
7. Cyert, R. M., & March, J. G. (1963). A Behavioral Theory of the Firm. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
8. Simon, H. A. (1947). Administrative Behavior. New York: Macmillan.
9. Krasner, S. D. (1972). Are bureaucracies important? (Or Allison Wonderland). Foreign Policy, 7, 159–179.
10. Art, R. J. (1973). Bureaucratic politics and American foreign policy: A critique. Policy Sciences, 4(4), 467–490.
11. Bendor, J., & Hammond, T. H. (1992). Rethinking Allison's models. American Political Science Review, 86(2), 301–322.
12. Welch, D. A. (1992). The organizational process and bureaucratic politics paradigms: Retrospect and prospect. International Security, 17(2), 112–146.
13. Rosati, J. A. (1981). Developing a systematic decision-making framework: Bureaucratic politics in perspective. World Politics, 33(2), 234–252.