Starting from MM
Modigliani and Miller (1958) showed that in a perfect market capital structure is irrelevant to value. Later theories explain how taxes, distress costs and information problems change that conclusion.
Main theories
- Trade-off theory: firms balance the tax shield of debt against the costs of financial distress, implying a target debt ratio.
- Pecking order theory: Myers and Majluf (1984) argued that because managers know more than investors, equity issues send a negative signal, so firms prefer internal funds, then debt, then new equity.
- Agency theory: Jensen and Meckling (1976) traced financing choices to conflicts among shareholders, managers and creditors; debt can discipline managers.
- Market timing: firms issue equity when shares are overvalued (Baker and Wurgler, 2002).
In practice
Evidence supports parts of each view: profitable firms tend to borrow less, as the pecking order predicts, while industries show stable leverage targets, as the trade-off view predicts. Credit ratings and financial flexibility also shape decisions.
References
- Modigliani, F., & Miller, M. H. (1958). The cost of capital, corporation finance and the theory of investment. American Economic Review, 48(3), 261-297.
- Myers, S. C., & Majluf, N. S. (1984). Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have. Journal of Financial Economics, 13(2), 187-221.
- Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305-360.
- Baker, M., & Wurgler, J. (2002). Market timing and capital structure. Journal of Finance, 57(1), 1-32.