Motivated Reasoning

Kunda's theory and its origins

Festinger's (1957) cognitive dissonance theory, which showed that people change their thinking to reduce inconsistency between beliefs and behavior, laid the groundwork for research on motivation and cognition. Lord, Ross and Lepper (1979) showed the same mixed evidence to people with firm views for and against the death penalty: both sides rated studies supporting their position as more convincing and became more extreme, a pattern called biased assimilation. Synthesizing such work, Kunda (1990) explained that people hold both accuracy goals and directional goals, and that directional goals lead them to selectively retrieve memories and rules that can justify the desired conclusion. She stressed, however, that people do not believe whatever they like; they reach desired conclusions only when they can construct plausible justifications.

Motivated skepticism and politics

Ditto and Lopez (1992) showed experimentally that people demand more information and apply stricter standards to conclusions they do not want, a phenomenon called motivated skepticism. Taber and Lodge (2006) reported that, when evaluating political arguments, more knowledgeable people were more inclined to accept congenial arguments and counterargue against opposing ones. Kahan (2013) and Kahan and colleagues (2017) proposed motivated numeracy: even highly numerate people misinterpret data in their side's favor on politically charged issues such as gun control, which they explained as identity-protective cognition. In a meta-analysis, Ditto and colleagues (2019) reported that liberals and conservatives show similar levels of partisan bias.

Economic interpretations and counterarguments

Babcock and Loewenstein (1997) argued that negotiations can break down because each party interprets what is fair in a self-serving way. Bénabou and Tirole (2016) modeled motivated beliefs in economics, treating beliefs as consumption goods that yield utility and investment goods that sustain motivation, while Epley and Gilovich (2016) outlined their psychological mechanics. Mercier and Sperber (2011) proposed the argumentative theory, holding that reasoning evolved to persuade others and construct arguments rather than to find truth. By contrast, Pennycook and Rand (2019) countered that belief in fake news is better explained by lazy thinking, a failure to reflect enough, than by motivated reasoning. The concept is discussed alongside confirmation bias and research on misinformation.

FAQ

What is motivated reasoning in simple terms?

It is deciding first what you want to believe, then readily accepting evidence that fits and nitpicking evidence that does not. It shows up especially in judgments about politics or a favorite sports team.

How does motivated reasoning differ from confirmation bias?

Confirmation bias broadly refers to seeking and remembering information that confirms existing beliefs. Motivated reasoning focuses on the underlying motive to reach a desired conclusion and stresses that the very standards for evaluating evidence shift.

Sources reviewed: 2026-10-26

References

1. Festinger, L. (1957). A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
2. Lord, C. G., Ross, L., & Lepper, M. R. (1979). Biased assimilation and attitude polarization: The effects of prior theories on subsequently considered evidence. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37(11), 2098–2109.
3. Kunda, Z. (1990). The case for motivated reasoning. Psychological Bulletin, 108(3), 480–498.
4. Ditto, P. H., & Lopez, D. F. (1992). Motivated skepticism: Use of differential decision criteria for preferred and nonpreferred conclusions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63(4), 568–584.
5. Babcock, L., & Loewenstein, G. (1997). Explaining bargaining impasse: The role of self-serving biases. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11(1), 109–126.
6. Taber, C. S., & Lodge, M. (2006). Motivated skepticism in the evaluation of political beliefs. American Journal of Political Science, 50(3), 755–769.
7. Bénabou, R., & Tirole, J. (2016). Mindful economics: The production, consumption, and value of beliefs. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 30(3), 141–164.
8. Kahan, D. M. (2013). Ideology, motivated reasoning, and cognitive reflection. Judgment and Decision Making, 8(4), 407–424.
9. Kahan, D. M., Peters, E., Dawson, E. C., & Slovic, P. (2017). Motivated numeracy and enlightened self-government. Behavioural Public Policy, 1(1), 54–86.
10. Mercier, H., & Sperber, D. (2011). Why do humans reason? Arguments for an argumentative theory. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 34(2), 57–74.
11. Pennycook, G., & Rand, D. G. (2019). Lazy, not biased: Susceptibility to partisan fake news is better explained by lack of reasoning than by motivated reasoning. Cognition, 188, 39–50.
12. Ditto, P. H., et al. (2019). At least bias is bipartisan: A meta-analytic comparison of partisan bias in liberals and conservatives. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 14(2), 273–291.
13. Epley, N., & Gilovich, T. (2016). The mechanics of motivated reasoning. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 30(3), 133–140.