Distributive versus integrative
Walton and McKersie (1965) distinguished win-lose distributive bargaining over a fixed pie from integrative bargaining, where trading issues of different priority (logrolling) creates joint value.
Key concepts
- BATNA: best alternative to a negotiated agreement, the source of leverage.
- Reservation price: walk-away point.
- ZOPA: zone of possible agreement between reservation prices.
Principled negotiation
Fisher and Ury's Getting to Yes: separate people from the problem, focus on interests not positions, invent options for mutual gain, use objective criteria.
Psychology and game theory
Anchoring, loss aversion and the fixed-pie bias shape outcomes (see behavioural finance). The Nash bargaining solution maximises the product of gains.
Public and international talks
Putnam's two-level games link international bargaining with domestic ratification; similar ideas inform public dispute resolution and deliberative polling.
References
- Fisher, R., Ury, W., & Patton, B. (2011). Getting to Yes (3rd ed.). Penguin.
- Walton, R. E., & McKersie, R. B. (1965). A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations. McGraw-Hill.
- Raiffa, H. (1982). The Art and Science of Negotiation. Harvard University Press.
- Putnam, R. D. (1988). Diplomacy and domestic politics: The logic of two-level games. International Organization, 42(3), 427-460.
- Nash, J. F. (1950). The bargaining problem. Econometrica, 18(2), 155-162.