What is a network effect?
A network effect (or network externality) exists when the value one person gets from a product depends on how many other people use it. A single telephone is useless, but each new subscriber adds people you can call, so the phone becomes more valuable to everyone.
Jeffrey Rohlfs analyzed this in 1974 in his study of demand for communications services, and Michael Katz and Carl Shapiro formalized in 1985 how network externalities shape competition and firms' decisions about compatibility.
Direct and indirect effects
- Direct network effects: value rises with the number of users in the same group, as with telephones, messengers and social networks.
- Indirect network effects: growth on one side raises value for another side. More console owners attract more game developers, and more games attract more owners.
- Negative network effects: too many users can bring congestion, spam or lower quality.
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Critical mass and tipping
In markets with strong network effects, growth is slow until a user base reaches critical mass and then accelerates. Because users choose based on expectations about which product will become the standard, markets can tip toward one product, producing winner-take-all outcomes.
Network effects also create lock-in and switching costs. Katz and Shapiro showed that whether a firm allows compatibility with rivals therefore becomes a key strategic decision.
Two-sided markets and platforms
A platform is an intermediary that connects distinct groups of users so they can transact or interact. Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole analyzed these as two-sided markets in 2003. App stores (developers and users), payment cards (merchants and cardholders) and delivery apps (restaurants and customers) are examples.
- Price structure: platforms rarely charge both sides the same. One side, often consumers, pays little or nothing while the other pays fees. Rochet and Tirole showed that the split of prices between sides, not just the total, determines volume.
- Chicken-and-egg problem: without sellers there are no buyers and vice versa, so platforms often subsidize one side at launch.
- Multi-homing: users who use several platforms at once weaken tipping and keep competition alive.
The platform economy and regulation
Platforms lower transaction costs and create new markets, but network effects push markets toward concentration. Self-preferencing, rising commissions, data concentration and unfair terms for businesses on the platform have become policy issues, and the debate extends to merger review and competition law. The legal status of people who work through platforms connects to the debate on dependent contractors.
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청년문화예술패스 하반기 추가 발급 — 2006·2007년생 최대 20만 원, 11월 30일까지
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209 readers so far
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Criticism and limits
- Network effects do not always produce a single winner; multi-homing, differentiation and local markets let several platforms coexist.
- The slogan that more users always means more value has been used to justify growth-at-all-costs strategies without evidence.
- When free services are paid for with personal data, consumer welfare is hard to judge by price alone.
References
- Rohlfs, J. (1974). A theory of interdependent demand for a communications service. Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 5(1), 16–37.
- Katz, M. L., & Shapiro, C. (1985). Network externalities, competition, and compatibility. American Economic Review, 75(3), 424–440.
- Rochet, J.-C., & Tirole, J. (2003). Platform competition in two-sided markets. Journal of the European Economic Association, 1(4), 990–1029.
- Eisenmann, T., Parker, G., & Van Alstyne, M. W. (2006). Strategies for two-sided markets. Harvard Business Review, 84(10), 92–101.
- Parker, G. G., Van Alstyne, M. W., & Choudary, S. P. (2016). Platform Revolution. New York: W. W. Norton.