How it works
Ranked-choice voting produces a majority winner like the two-round system without requiring voters to return to the polls. In multi-member districts the same principle is used in the single transferable vote. Bartholdi and Orlin (1991) showed that preference transfers make strategic manipulation computationally very hard. Still, as Arrow's impossibility theorem shows, it cannot satisfy every desirable condition.
Expected effects
Horowitz (1985) and Reilly (2001) argued that because candidates need second and third preferences from other groups' voters, the method can encourage moderate, inclusive campaigns in divided societies. Donovan, Tolbert and Gracey (2016) found that voters in US cities using ranked-choice voting perceived campaigns as less negative. It is also expected to reduce vote splitting and the need for strategic voting.
Limits and debates
Burnett and Kogan (2015) noted that many voters do not rank all candidates, so ballots become 'exhausted' in the final rounds and winners may lack a majority of all ballots cast. Donovan and colleagues (2019) reported that most voters say they understand the system, though with group differences. Supporters of approval voting argue that simpler alternatives exist.
FAQ
- What is ranked-choice voting in simple terms?
- You number candidates in order of preference, and the last-place candidate's ballots move to the next choice until someone has a majority.
- What is ballot exhaustion?
- When a voter ranks only some candidates and all of them are eliminated, the ballot no longer counts in later rounds.
Sources reviewed: 2026-10-26
References
- Bartholdi, J. J., III, & Orlin, J. B. (1991). Single transferable vote resists strategic voting. Social Choice and Welfare, 8(4), 341–354. Resistance to manipulation.
- Reilly, B. (2001). Democracy in divided societies: Electoral engineering for conflict management. Cambridge University Press. Preferential voting in divided societies.
- Horowitz, D. L. (1985). Ethnic groups in conflict. University of California Press. Vote pooling across groups.
- Donovan, T., Tolbert, C., & Gracey, K. (2016). Campaign civility under preferential and plurality voting. Electoral Studies, 42, 157–163. Campaign civility.
- Burnett, C. M., & Kogan, V. (2015). Ballot (and voter) "exhaustion" under instant runoff voting: An examination of four ranked-choice elections. Electoral Studies, 37, 41–49. Ballot exhaustion.
- Donovan, T., Tolbert, C., & Gracey, K. (2019). Self-reported understanding of ranked-choice voting. Social Science Quarterly, 100(5), 1768–1776. Voter understanding.
- Arrow, K. J. (1951). Social choice and individual values. Wiley. Limits of all voting rules.